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Abstract
Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan presidents all supported neoliberal
reforms. The reactions of their congresses, however, varied remarkably. The Argentine
and Brazilian Congresses often ignored policy, approving reforms in exchange for pork
and patronage. The Uruguayan Congress, on the other hand, often rejected reforms on
policy grounds. This paper argues that the disproportionate rural tilt of the Argentine
and Brazilian legislatures, which the Uruguayan legislature lacked, explains this
discrepancy. Scholars have frequently referred to an overrepresented, underdeveloped
periphery and underrepresented developed metropolis in Argentina and Brazil. I test
this characterization, finding it generally true albeit with significant exceptions. I argue
that overrepresented areas’ lower development led to a weaker civil society,
strengthening politicians who focus on pork. I also find that Argentine legislators from
the exceptional developed but overrepresented areas received particularly large amounts
of pork, giving them an incentive to agree to presidents’ neoliberal agendas.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Irony is not a quality typically associated with economic reforms. Argentina
and Brazil’s turn to neoliberalism in the 1990s, however, was an ironic one. The postWorld War II histories of both countries revolved around a bitter battle between
populist movements agitating for the expansion of the social state through electoral
democracy and economic elites defending their privileges through authoritarian
government.

By the end of the 1980s, the oligarchy’s authoritarian option had

disappeared and it finally had to defend its interests in the democratic arena—exactly
where it had lost in the past.
Surprisingly, economic elites succeeded in not only defending their privileges in
the 1990s, but expanding them too. Democratically elected presidents (Menem and De
la Rúa in Argentina; Collor and Cardoso in Brazil) implemented unpopular economic
reforms such as cuts in social spending and the privatization of public companies. It
seems that democracy in the 1990s had more success in making the sorts of changes
that economic elites had long advocated than did the military regimes they had
supported.

On the other hand, the reason why presidents throughout this newly

democratic continent adopted these unpopular reforms is quite clear: the international
lending institutions whose loans they needed to keep their countries out of bankruptcy
demanded their adoption (Stallings 1992; Vacs 1994; Teichman 2001). Presidents—
many of them with leftist pasts—thus made the not unreasonable calculation that as
painful as these reforms might prove, they would not pose as strong a threat to their
fragile democracies as the chaos resulting from defaulted billion dollar loans.
Legislators, on the other hand, do not face the same constraints as executives.
Accountable only to their constituencies, they may place themselves at electoral risk if
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they vote in a way that directly harms their constituents—as the privatization of a major
employer may do—but not necessarily receive credit for an ensuing economic recovery.
Unless they are loyal to the president—and the provincial/state focus of Argentine and
Brazilian federal politics limits the number of legislators with such strong loyalties
(Ames 1995; Spiller and Tommassi 2006)—they have no incentive to vote to increase
unemployment, cut social spending, and cause the costs of water and electricity to soar.
Yet, the congresses of both countries did generally support these deep, painful,
and unpopular economic reforms.

The Argentine Congress approved the sale of

gigantic public industries like the state oil company, the convertibility law that pegged
the Argentine peso to the U.S. dollar (and thus placed Argentine exports at a severe
competitive disadvantage), and replaced the public retirement system with private
pensions.

Similarly, the Brazilian Congress allowed the privatization of public

companies like the state telephone company, and major free market reforms of the tax
and social security systems.
A look at the congress of Uruguay, a small country sandwiched in between
Argentina and Brazil, reveals that legislative support for these economic reforms was
not as automatic as executive support. Uruguayan presidents Sanguinetti and Lacalle
faced the same international pressures as Collor and Menem, and advocated the same
radical agenda. Their reforms lacked legislative support and did not become law as
written by the executive like in Argentina and Brazil; only substantive compromise
between the executive and legislative branches allowed any reform to occur (O’Donnell
1994). The Congress pushed back against the privatization of state-owned enterprises
and the social security system, forcing the executive to compromise on both (Blake
1998). Why such disparate outcomes between these legislatures? Did the Argentine and
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Brazilian legislatures approve reforms out of a greater loyalty to their presidents? Or
did they have a greater ideological commitment to neoliberalism than the Uruguayan
Congress? Or were they simply uninterested in economic policy?

Different Types of Legislatures
A closer examination of policymaking in all three countries during the 1990s
reveals an even more notable difference in process than outcome. The process of
economic reform that took place in Uruguay would not seem abnormal to a North
American observer: the President wanted far-reaching economic reforms and the
Congress mostly opposed them. They reached a compromise of ambitious reforms
where agreement existed (tariffs) and milder measures where there was disagreement
(social security) (Blake 1998).
The Argentine and Brazilian policymaking process, on the other hand, had a
fundamentally different character. Large-scale reforms in the United States result from
agreement between the executive and legislative branches or when public opinion is
overwhelmingly in favor. Yet, the Argentine and Brazilian parties typically associated
with economic elites lacked majorities in both congresses and there was no grassroots
Thatcherian revolution in either country agitating for deregulation.

Instead, the

congresses usually abdicated their roles as policymaking institutions, giving the
president mostly free reign, and generally did not reject the president’s policy initiatives
on substantive grounds (O’Donnell 1994). In exchange they demanded large amounts
of federal resources for their constituencies (pork) and federal jobs (patronage). Both
congresses would sometimes prevent the passage of economic reforms—the Brazilian
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Congress quite often—but more because the president did not satisfy pork and
patronage demands than because of the reforms’ policy substance (Ames 2002b).
Cox and Morgenstern (2001) have developed a typology of legislative behavior
that provides a theoretical description for these different behaviors. The Argentine and
Brazilian legislatures acted in a manner they call “venal-parochial” while the
Uruguayan legislature acted in a “workable” (programmatic but willing to negotiate)
manner. This study’s objective is to explain why the Argentine/Brazilian legislatures
fell into one category and the Uruguayan legislature fell into another. It does not view
its explanation as a monocausal silver bullet; the discrepancy between the
Argentine/Brazilian and Uruguayan congresses’ behaviors was so large that a single
cause is unlikely.

Legislative Malapportionment as an Explanation
Both the Argentine and Brazilian congresses share a key but often overlooked
feature: the extreme overrepresentation of some populations and the correspondingly
extreme underrepresentation of other populations. As in the U.S. Senate, the Argentine
and Brazilian Senates allot an equal number of seats for each province/state. In the
Argentine Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) each province has at least five
deputies irrespective of its population and each Brazilian state has at least eight in its
Chamber of Deputies. Combined with the large population differences between states
and provinces in both countries, these allotments of seats create a high degree of
“legislative malapportionment,” defined as the “discrepancy between the shares of
legislative seats and the shares of population held by geographical units” (Samuels and
Snyder 2001b).
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A few examples illustrate the heavy malapportionment of both countries’
legislatures. The least populous Argentine province, Tierra del Fuego, had a population
of 100,000 in 2001 while the most populous province, the Province of Buenos Aires,
had a population of almost 14 million. The rules of representation thus gave a voter in
Tierra del Fuego 140 times the representation in the Senate and 10 times the
representation in the Chamber of Deputies as a voter in the Province of Buenos Aires.
Similarly, the least populous Brazilian state of Roraima had a population of 391,000 in
2006 and the most populous state, São Paulo, had a population of 40 million. A vote
cast in Roraima was worth 105 times more in a senatorial election and 21 times more in
a deputy election than a vote cast in São Paulo. In Argentina, 33% of the population
elects 79% of the senate seats and in Brazil 44% of the population elects 73% of the
senate seats.

In their ranking of malapportioned national assemblies worldwide,

Samuels and Snyder (2001b) rank the Argentine and Brazilian Senates as the first and
second most malapportioned upper chambers respectively and their Chambers of
Deputies as the 16th and 17th most malapportioned lower chambers respectively.
Uruguay, on the other hand, has very little malapportionment in its lower house
because it only requires a minimum of two deputies per department and absolutely none
in its upper house because it is elected from a single, national multimember district
(Samuels and Snyder 2001). Could these differences in apportionment explain the
different behaviors of the Argentine/Brazilian and Uruguayan congresses? Such strong
malapportionment could affect the policymaking process and policy outcomes in stark
but previously unnoticed ways. Only one previous study (Gibson and Calvo 2000,
“Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies: Territorial Dimensions of Economic
Reform in Argentina”) connects legislative malapportionment with the approval of the
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radical economic agenda of the 1990s in either country. No study has previously
considered Uruguay’s correct legislative apportionment as a contributing factor to its
relatively policy-oriented congress.

Outline of Argument
The central argument of this study is that legislative malapportionment was a
lead contributor to the pork/patronage focus of the Argentine and Brazilian legislatures
while the lack thereof allowed the Uruguayan legislature to fulfill its role as a
policymaking institution. Chapter 2, the literature review, has two objectives. First, it
will both define this study’s relationship to existing scholarship on the three
legislatures, legislative-executive relations, the enactment of neoliberal reforms, and
legislative malapportionment. Second, it will refine existing concepts and expose their
limitations in explaining the behavior of all three congresses. Chapter 3 will measure
how over- and underrepresented areas differ on key demographic predictors of
democratic success, and how this distinguishes the nation the congresses represent from
the one they govern.

Chapter 4 forges an explanation for exactly how

malapportionment and differing scores on these predictors affects congressional
behavior in the three cases.

Chapter 5 argues that even lightly populated

provinces/states that perform well on democratic predictors have congressional
delegations that focus on pork and patronage because of how malapportionment
influences the costs of buying votes through pork. Next, I outline the arguments of
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 in greater detail.
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Table 1.1: Cases, Scores on Independent Variables, and Scores on
Dependent Variables
Case

Level of Malapportionment
(Independent Variable)

Focus of Congress (Dependent Variable)

Argentina

High

Pork/Patronage

Brazil

High

Pork/Patronage

Uruguay

Very Low

Policy

Chapter 3: Measuring the Divide: How Does the Nation the Argentine and
Brazilian Congresses Represent Differ from the Nation they Serve?
Previous scholarship on malapportionment in Argentina and Brazil divides both
countries into two regions: a “metropolitan region” consisting of a contiguous area of
the country where one finds the largest cities and the majority of the population and a
“peripheral region,” which tends to be less densely populated since it contains the vast
majority of the territory but a minority of the population (Gibson and Calvo 2000). In
general, the metropolitan region’s population is richer and better educated than the
population of the periphery. It is also the area that is the most underrepresented in both
congresses.
Although scholars have long mentioned these differences in passing or even
used them as the focus of their study (O’Donnell 1993; Selcher 1998; Gibson and Calvo
2000; Calvo and Murillo 2004), nobody has actually measured them before. I use
Argentine and Brazilian census and U.N. Development Programme data in Chapter 3 to
measure the developmental divide between the metropolitan provinces/states and the
peripheral provinces/states. I find clear disparities between the metro and the periphery,
but I also discover five provinces in the Argentine periphery and five states in the
Brazilian periphery that display similar education, poverty, and human development
11

levels to their respective metros. This “highly developed periphery” is a new concept
that previous scholars have not mentioned and plays the central role in the fifth chapter.
Next, I measure how much malapportionment increases the representation of
areas that lag behind the rest of the country in development. I calculate the division
between the nation the legislatures represent and the nation the legislatures serve on a
critical measure of development, the U.N. Human Development Index (HDI). Using
the state/provincial HDI indexes, I calculate their average apportioned as the chambers
of deputies and senates are apportioned.

This allows us to observe how many

legislators representing constituencies above or below certain development levels
malapportionment adds or subtracts as well as allows us to compare the nations the
legislatures represent with other developing nations.

Chapter 4: The Hall of Mirrors and the Overrepresentation of Poverty
Previous scholarship demonstrates that civil society development, education,
and widely distributed wealth contribute to a politics of inclusion (Oxhorn and
Ducatenzeiler 1999). Where a significant proportion of the population is undereducated
and impoverished, politics is more likely to focus on pork and patronage.
Malapportionment can create a critical distinction between the country a legislature
represents and the country it serves: if areas that lag behind the rest of the country in
education, wealth, and civil society development are overrepresented in the legislatures,
then the legislature may act like the legislature of a less developed nation.

The

Argentine and Brazilian legislatures tend to overrepresent the less developed areas and
underrepresent the more developed areas.

This may account for them behaving

differently from a similarly developed country like Uruguay—a country that does not
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share the extreme regional disparities as Argentina and Brazil, and whose congress does
not overrepresent its regions that do fall behind. In this way, malapportionment acts
like a “hall of mirrors” at carnival since it takes certain features of Argentine and
Brazilian society and distorts their influence in the legislature.

Chapter 5: Low-Maintenance and Lower-Maintenance Constituencies
Gibson and Calvo (2000) find that malapportionment played an important role
in the passage of neoliberal reforms because it created an incentive structure that
favored pork and patronage-based politics. More specifically, they argued that “lowmaintenance constituencies”— lightly populated but overrepresented districts in which
a relatively small amount of federal funds can work out to a considerable per capita
sum—played an important role in the passage of neoliberal reforms in Argentina. I take
the study of low-maintenance constituencies a step farther by examining how they
interact with the first causal process: do they actually increase the number of legislators
with a focus on pork or do they simply reinforce the orientation of legislators whose
constituencies would suggest a focus on pork?
I find that the low-maintenance constituency logic played a key role in
Argentina because some peripheral provinces that were highly developed were also the
least populated. These constituencies score at least as well as metropolitan provinces in
the demographic characteristics measured in Chapter 3 but their voters/legislators acted
in a manner more similar to other peripheral provinces than metropolitan provinces. I
explain this behavior through their particularly low populations, making them “lowermaintenance constituencies.”

I hypothesize that these provinces tended to receive

particularly large amounts of federal resources per capita because their affluent,
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educated residents would only allow their members of congress to vote for unpopular
economic reforms if they were well compensated. I test this by applying the highly
developed and less developed periphery distinction to Calvo and Gibson’s data for
Argentina and similar data in Brazil. This reveals that the increase in discretionary
funds which Calvo and Gibson emphasize was concentrated in the highly developed
periphery and the share that went to the less developed periphery actually declined
during the 1990s. Thus the low-maintenance constituency argument applied to a select
few cases in Argentina. In Brazil, the highly developed periphery did not receive as
disproportionate a share as in Argentina, most likely because it is not as
underpopulated.
Uruguay provides a particularly interesting contrast because its senators are
elected from a single, nationwide district. This eliminates not only the ability of the
executive to divide and conquer efficiently through low-maintenance constituencies, but
even to divide and conquer inefficiently through separate constituencies since senators
are only responsible to the nation.

Why the Argentine and Brazilian Congresses acted so differently from the Uruguayan
Congress is a puzzle deserving explanation. All three followed the same political
trajectory since the 1970s, have similar midlevel GDPs, agricultural export-based
economies, and Argentina and Uruguay share strong cultural similarities. This study
constitutes a Most Similar Systems Design with differing levels of legislative
malapportionment as the explanatory variable. Legislative malapportionment affects
congressional behavior in an indirect, procedural manner and thus requires extensive
explanation. Through a rethinking of the literature on the legislative politics of South
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American economic reform, analysis of demographic and federal tax data, and the
application of existing qualitative knowledge, this study will clarify the relationship
between congressional strength in policymaking and legislative malapportionment.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Electoral Rules and Ambition in Latin American Legislatures
Scholars have traditionally seen Latin American legislatures as minor players in
the policy process (Morgenstern 2002, 1-2) and therefore have focused more on the
central traditional players in Latin American politics: presidents, oligarchic parties,
populist parties, militaries, and governors. Recently, however, scholars have begun to
examine legislatures in greater detail, using many of the concepts and techniques
scholars have used to study the U.S. Congress. Principle among these has been David
Mayhew’s notion that legislators are “ambitious” and that by understanding their
ambition we understand the central drivers of their behavior (Morgenstern 2002, 16-18).
Key determinants of legislators’ ambitions are the electoral system and the nation’s
common political career paths.

Understanding how institutions and legislator’s

ambitions interact and influence one another has yielded an impressive amount of
information on the internal workings of legislatures as well as resulting outcomes.
What follows is a summary of what existing literature tell us about the selection of
legislators in all three cases and how it affects their voting behavior.
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Table 2.1: Election Systems and Legislative Voting Behavior in
Comparative Perspective
Lower House Election
System

Argentina

Brazil

Uruguay

Upper House Election
Determinants of
System
Voting Behavior
Provincial legislatures elected
Proportional
Province and party
senators until 1994. After 1994,
representation,
are very strong
winning party in popular vote
multimember districts,
determinants of
receives two seats and runner up
closed ballots
voting behavior
receives three
Proportional
State is a fairly
strong and party is a
representation,
Popular election
weak determinant of
multimember districts,
voting behavior
open ballots
Faction (sublema) is
Double simultaneous vote in
Multimember districts,
a strong determinant
double simultaneous vote national multimember district
of voting behavior

Argentina
Argentina is a federal, presidential republic consisting of 23 autonomous
provinces and a semi-autonomous capital city.1 The legislature is bicameral, with a
Chamber of Deputies (theoretically) apportioned based on population and a Senate
apportioned based on provincial territory. There are 257 federal deputies and provinces
serve as multimember districts, electing anywhere from five to seventy deputies.
Deputies are elected on closed party lists and seats distributed proportionally. Until
recently, the senate was elected in the same manner as in the United States before the
seventeenth amendment, with provincial legislatures electing two senators in staggered
terms. After the 1994 constitutional reform, however, each province received three
senators, two senators going to the winning party and the third going to the runner up.
There are currently seventy-two senate seats.
Despite a similar constitutional structure to the United States, the Argentine
Congress functions very differently from the U.S. Congress. First, Argentina’s closed
1

For the purposes of this study, I will refer to the Federal Capital as a province since the same laws apply
to it for purposes of federal legislative representation.
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list party ballots give provincial party bosses a great deal of influence over deputies
since they have almost unchallenged power in deciding who appears on the ballot and in
what position the list (Jones 2002). Moreover, both deputies and senators rarely serve
more than one term and usually opt to return to the province to work in the provincial
party boss’s machine instead of seek reelection (Jones et al., 2002). Second, clientelism
and patronage play a more central role in Argentine than in U.S. politics, functioning as
the prime electoral strategies that provincial party machines use to gain power and elect
their federal legislators. The power of the pork barrel in many Argentine provinces
places the party boss at the center of provincial politics, meaning that he can use
clientelism and patronage to make any primaries go his desired way (De Luca, Jones,
and Tula, 2002). Members seek to serve the provincial party boss for one term instead
of spend decades gathering the power to formulate national policy as in the U.S.
Congress.
Party bosses generally focus on provincial politics and “loan” their
congressional delegation to the national legislative party leadership on most matters
(Jones et. al, 2002). Other times, they use their congressional delegation to bargain with
the executive to extract federal resources for their partisan machines (Hwang and Jones
2006). Party bosses often serve simultaneously as governor, melding the demands of
partisan machines and provincial governments. This can result in massive resource
transfers from the federal government to the provinces as presidents need to buy votes
to enact their national agendas (Eaton 2006). Though scholars often call governors a
“fourth branch” of government in federal systems, Argentine governors can supplant the
legislative branch through their control of it.
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Argentine electoral politics and the ambition thus help explain legislators’ focus
on pork/patronage.

On the other hand, these explanations do not describe why

Argentine voters respond more to pork and patronage than to policy when voting for
congress. As I will explain in greater detail in Chapter 4, development generally
decreases the efficacy of pork and patronage in winning votes and Argentina was a
highly developed country in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Argentina’s U.N. Human
Development Index (the global measure of development) in 1992 was higher than every
new Eastern European democracy and slightly lower than consolidated democracies like
Luxembourg and Ireland—none of which had legislatures as venal as the Argentine
legislature (Human Development Report 1992). Any complete explanation for the
Argentine legislature’s behavior must explain why its voters responded positively to the
types of political machines that its electoral system enabled.

Brazil
The broad outlines of the Constitution of the Brazilian Republic are similar to
those of the Argentine: a federal, presidential republic with twenty-six autonomous
states and an autonomous federal district. The Chamber of Deputies and Federal Senate
serve the same representative functions in Brazil as in Argentina.

The Chamber

consists of 513 deputies who are elected to four-year terms. Significantly, they are
elected on open party lists and proportionally represented with the states serving as
multimember districts, electing anywhere between eight and 70 deputies. Voters can
vote for a candidate or a party, and the votes for a party’s candidates are pooled together
to determine how many seats the party wins. The candidates with the most votes on
each party list win the seats allocated to their party. The Federal Senate consists of 81
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members, with each state and the federal district receiving three senators. Senators
serve eight-year terms in alternating cycles and are elected by popular vote.
The combination of an open list ballot, proportional representation, and large
multimember districts has created a famously dysfunctional party system in the
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.

Since candidates for the Chamber must compete

against as many as sixty-nine other members of the same party for a seat, significant
intraparty competition exists (Mainwaring 1992, 26-28; Ames 2002a, 65-74).
Candidates focus on their own campaigns and seek to undercut fellow party members
instead of focusing on raising the total party vote as makes sense with a closed-list.
Deputies even change parties as it suits their clientelistic needs, making party affiliation
a terrible predictor of voting patterns. Deputies must differentiate themselves from
other party members and focus on clientelistic relationships with certain neighborhoods
and municipalities to win election.
Pork barrel and patronage play an even more important role in Brazil than in
Argentina. Provincial party bosses use their access to state and municipal resources to
bring Chamber candidates and deputies into their party since they depend on those
resources to win election to the Chamber or for their post-Chamber careers
(Mainwaring 1992, 682). In this way they can use their legislative leverage to bring
federal resources into the province, as studies of the Joint Budget Committee show
(Ames 1995). Nevertheless, the relationship between bosses/governors and deputies is
more provisional than in Argentina because of the weak role parties have with the open
list ballot and deputies will often change parties, the term for which is appropriately
“party-renting” (Despostato 2006). The Brazilian Chamber of Deputies is therefore
much more difficult to govern than either the Argentine Chamber or Senate because of

20

the dysfunctional party system. The Brazilian president must always govern as if his
party is the minority party in Congress (even if it is in the majority) and create a
legislative coalition for each bill, an expensive and difficult task.
The political ambition that results from a dysfunctional party system provides an
important explanation for why the Brazilian Congress focuses on pork and patronage.
Unlike Argentina, Brazil had only reached a medium level of development in the early
1990s and thus its congress’s strong pork/patronage focus should not surprise observers.
On the other hand, large portions of the South and Southeast—where the majority of the
population lives—display relatively high levels of development, levels only slightly
below Argentina. We should thus expect a strong presence of legislators who do not
operate venally, but descriptions of the Brazilian Congress do not mention much of one.
This discrepancy requires explanation and political ambition does not explain it for the
same reason as it does not in Argentina: why do voters respond to pork and patronage
instead of policy?

Uruguay
As opposed to its neighbors, Uruguay is a unitary republic. Its Congress is
known as the “General Assembly” (Asamblea General) and is divided into a lower
Chamber of Representatives and an upper Chamber of Senators. The Chamber of
Representatives consists of ninety-nine representatives elected in multi-member districts
(departments, the Uruguayan subnational unit, serve as the districts) with each
department receiving at least two seats. The Chamber of Senators consists of thirty
members in addition to a vice president who has a voice and vote in the chamber.
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Senate elections have no territorial component: senators are elected from one
multimember district encompassing the whole country.
Uruguay uses a “double simultaneous vote” (DSV or ley de lemas) for
legislative elections, which places primaries and general elections onto one ballot. Each
party is formally termed a lema and can present several closed lists of candidates within
that party termed sublemas.

Lemas receive the share of seats in the legislature

proportional to the percentage its sublemas won and each sublema receives the
proportion of those seats that it won within the lema. Importantly, candidates are
linked: a voter choosing one sublema for president can only choose senate lists within
that sublema (a “subsublema” so to speak), and then only choose a representative list
tied to the senate list chosen (a “subsubsublema” so to speak). A 1996 constitutional
reform delinked presidential elections, establishing a separate election date but the
connection between senate and representative lists remained (Cason 2000).
What are the most important influences on legislators’ behavior in Uruguay? As
a unitary republic, there are no governors to influence members of congress in Uruguay
as there are in Argentina and Brazil. What about parties? Throughout most of the
twentieth century, two highly pragmatic parties dominated Uruguayan politics: the
Partido Colorado and the Partido Nacional, better known as the Partido Blanco. Despite
the stability and enduring nature of these two parties, however, the DSV system was
actually originally developed to maintain independent but internally disciplined factions
within the parties (Cason 2000). Morgenstern (2004) unlocked the patterns behind
Uruguayan legislative behavior in his study of roll call votes and found that sublemas
display a high degree of unity while lemas themselves rarely do (2004).

22

Sublemas not only tend to vote together but they also have major ideological
orientations, with a real right wing, left wing, and center (Morgenstern 2004, 76-77).
Though the Partido Colorado and Partido Blanco (lemas) tend toward pragmatism and
are generally non-ideological, sublemas within the same lema often campaign against
one another and win elections on ideological bases.

Further contributing to the

programmatic nature of Uruguayan legislative politics is the emergence of a coalition of
fractured leftist parties called the Frente Amplio (the Broad Front). The Frente Amplio
grew in popularity during the 1980s and 1990s, and distinguishes itself from the other
parties with its highly ideological character on the lema level.
The combination of ideological, programmatic sublemas in the Blanco and
Colorado parties, and the ideological Frente Amplio helps create a political system in
Uruguay that focuses on policy and not pork. The sublema also discourages clientelism
because of their closed lists like in Argentina and the single national list for senate,
which should force legislators to think in a more national manner. Uruguay’s electoral
system is thus an important part of the explanation for the differing outcomes this study
seeks to explain. On the other hand, Morgenstern and Cason only show that sublemas
and the Frente Amplio determine voting behavior on a programmatic basis. They do
not explain why the basis is programmatic and not centered around pork and patronage.

In conclusion, the electoral system the ambition of legislators in all three cases is
an important influence on how the legislatures act. The focus on clientelism and
patronage in Argentine and Brazilian politics gives party bosses a significant amount of
leverage in the federal government since they exercise strong control over legislators’
careers. Argentina’s closed-list ballot, however, strengthens parties in the legislature
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while Brazil’s open-list ballot makes them highly unstable and unable to discipline their
members. On the other hand, the development levels of Argentina as a whole and
important parts of Brazil predict that clientelistic politics would not be nearly as
successful with voters as they were. Political ambition and electoral systems help
explain the behaviors of the congresses, but do not tell the whole story. Finally, the
DSV in Uruguay solidified the power of strong, disciplined, and programmatically
focused intra-party factions in Uruguay instead of parties.

In the next section, I

examine how the features discussed here affect interaction with the executive branch in
policy formulation.

Legislative-Executive Relations
How large a role do legislatures play in policy formulation? I answer this
question by viewing it as a zero sum game of legislative-executive relations. If the
legislature plays a strong role in policy formulation, this leaves less power for the
executive branch while if a legislature plays no role in policy formulation, the executive
has a monopoly on policy. Moreover, I consider a legislative branch that focuses more
on pork barrel politics instead of national policy formulation as a weak player since this
often means giving the executive a monopoly on policy as long as the legislature is
satisfied with the amount of pork it receives.
To give the characterizations of the different legislatures a more rigorous
theoretical grounding, I use Cox and Morgenstern’s typology legislative-executive
relations with some modifications. This typology describes the president’s level of
support in the legislature and the appropriate strategies for enacting his or her agenda
(Cox and Morgenstern 2002, 453): imperial executive/recalcitrant legislature, dominant
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executive/subservient legislature, coalitional executive/workable legislature, and
nationally-oriented executive/venal-parochial legislature.

Using the whole of

Morgenstern and Nacif’s book on Latin American legislatures as his empirical basis,
Morgenstern summarizes that constitutional design, legislators’ ambitions, the
legislature’s partisan composition, and the electoral system determine the legislature’s
and thus the executive’s category (Morgenstern 2002 441). This typology is a helpful
tool for moving discussion of Latin American legislatures beyond Mezey’s (1979)
typology of legislatures based solely on democratic support and policymaking power.
Nevertheless, I have two objections to their discussion of their typology, one
empirical and the other theoretical.

First, I believe that they mischaracterize the

Argentine and Brazilian Congresses and assign them the wrong categories by not
distinguishing sufficiently between behavior and outcome. Second, classifying whole
legislatures is not as analytically useful or even as accurate as classifying individual
legislators and placing them into groups based on their category. In this section, I
elaborate on these criticisms, apply them to my cases, and then relate them to my study.

Typology as Applied to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay
As useful as Cox and Morgenstern’s typology may be, it is easy to conflate
behaviors—which it seeks to explain—and outcomes when using it.

Their two

“extreme” types of legislative behavior, recalcitrant and subservient, always signify a
certain outcome, negative in the former and positive in the latter. The workable and
venal-parochial behaviors, however, do not guarantee either outcome. If a legislature is
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workable, the result will be positive or negative depending on the executive’s ability to
compromise with congress.

If it is venal-parochial, the result will depend on the

president’s ability to satisfy congress’s venal-parochial demands.
Of my three cases, Uruguay in the 1990s most clearly corresponds to Cox and
Morgenstern’s classification of it as coalitional/workable (Cox and Morgenstern, 456)
as I explained in the introduction. However, I take issue with Cox and Morgenstern’s
classifications of the Argentine and Brazilian Congresses since they underplay their
intensely venal-parochial natures by emphasizing outcomes instead of their actual
behaviors.
Morgenstern classifies the Argentine Congress as similar to the subservient
Mexican Congress, except for when both branches are held by different parties
(Morgenstern 443).

However, Menem’s far-reaching statutory reforms required

significant amounts of pork for congressional approval, even after the opposition lost its
majority in the House of Deputies. Such pork took the forms of shielding some areas of
the country from neoliberal reforms (Gibson and Calvo 2000) and modifying the
Federal Tax Sharing Agreement to favor certain provinces (Bambaci, Saront, and
Tommassi 2002; Eaton 2006) as just two examples. This behavior is clearly venalparochial and proved so expensive to the country—both examples I gave contributed to
the 2001 financial collapse—that Menem and De la Rúa would not have given into it
unless a not-so-subservient congress forced them.

Venal-parochial is thus a more

accurate characterization of this behavior.
Morgenstern’s classification of Brazil proves even more troublesome.
Morgenstern even concedes that classifying it proved difficult and categorized it as
“between the recalcitrant and a relatively venal-parochial variety of a workable type”
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(Morgenstern 2002, 443). The Brazilian Congress’s instances of recalcitrance may in
fact be venal-parochiality often with negative outcomes. For example, Cardoso’s push
for privatization of Social Security proved unsuccessful because he found the cost of
providing enough pork too high even after he had promised deputies lucrative
directorships of state owned firms and to take over the city of São Paulo’s massive debt
(Kay 1999, 414). Thus, the Brazilian Congress was not opposed in principal, but
simply demanded a price that was too high for the president. True recalcitrance is when
a legislature does not even consider a proposal and Kay shows that the Brazilian
Congress did consider Cardoso’s most unpopular reform, but only rejected because he
did not give enough pork.
Morgenstern’s classification of the Brazilian Congress as sometimes a
“relatively venal-parochial variety of workable” is curious since he provides no
examples of it every being a “workable” legislature. Ames writes:
Brazil’s legislature is quite active, but the Congress accomplishes little
on its own initiative, and its activism often results in obstructing
presidential proposals even though a majority of deputies have few
objections to the policy innovations themselves. Instead, presidential
proposals are subject to intense bargaining over extremely parochial
substantive interests and over pork and patronage (2002, 156).
This quote justifies placing the Brazilian Congress firmly into the venal-parochial
column.
If the Argentine and Brazilian congresses are both venal-parochial, we are left
with the dilemma of why the Argentine Congress ended up accepting most of Menem’s
agenda to the letter while the Brazilian Congress rejected a significant portion of Collor
and Cardoso’s. While the differences between categories are about the very nature of
executive-legislative interaction—if they negotiate and what they negotiate over—

27

intracategorical differences are about degree, i.e. how much pork it requires to pass a
bill in a venal-parochial legislature. It is not a question of whether, but how much. The
factors Morgenstern describes as defining a legislature’s category (the electoral system,
the party system, legislators’ progressive ambition, and the legislature’s partisan
composition) also help explain these intracategorical differences. For example, Brazil’s
fragmented party system means that the president has to forge a coalition in Congress
for each of his bills, requiring him to satisfy the venal-parochial demands of legislators
multiple times—which becomes very expensive. Argentina’s stronger party system and
party discipline in Congress, however, means that presidents have to spend significantly
less resources since their venal-parochial coalitions2 are more stable.
My critique of Cox and Morgenstern’s application of their typology of
legislatures and executives places the Argentine and Brazilian legislatures (venalparochial) into one category and the Uruguayan legislature into another (workable).
Using their terminology, this study will provide an explanation to this puzzle: why were
the Argentine and Brazilian legislatures venal-parochial and the Uruguayan legislature
workable?

Applying the Typology to Individual Legislative Behavior
An even more fundamental issue with Cox and Morgenstern’s typology is that
classifying whole legislatures in countries as politically diverse as Argentina and Brazil
can hide important insights. Legislatures are collections of different actors, each with
their own motivations and influences. Applying the typology to individual legislators
instead of the entire legislature would increase its explanatory power since behavior
2

Levitsky (1999) demonstrates that Menem helped change the Peronist Party into a party based on pork,
patronage, and clientelism.
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varies on the level of individual legislator.

Moreover, calculating the number of

legislators in one category may help us truly understand the actions of legislatures,
especially in assemblies where party affiliation means little. The oscillation of a
legislature between one category and another may in fact reflect the behavior of a few
legislators who determine which side the majority falls on.
A good example of different legislators in the same institution falling into
different categories would be the passage of the 2000 labor reform bill in Argentina.
This was a highly controversial measure since it would loosen Argentina’s labor market
and weaken unions, one of most powerful traditional actors in Argentina. Leftist
senators like Eduardo Duhalde attempted to obstruct it and later voted against it out of
recalcitrance while government supporters voted for it out of subservience. Before the
vote on the law, supporters did not appear to have the votes to win passage.

A

“compromise” emerged that moderated some of the policies like reducing changes in
collective bargaining and preventing reductions in salaries, gave $160 million to the
provinces, and, as was later discovered, involved the personal bribery of senators with
government funds (Gutierrez and Quiro 2000). Although it is difficult to know which
approach brought the vote of which senator, it is safe to assume that there were senators
who voted for it because of the changes in policy (workable), the increased amounts of
pork (venal-parochial), or the bribery money since the government would have
preferred a bill as close to the original pass.
In the case described above, the legislature did not clearly fall into one of Cox or
Morgenstern’s categories—even though individual senators clearly did. This requires a
reconceiving of the typology, that we scholars should think of legislatures not as being a
certain category but holding different sized groups of legislators in those categories.
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Thus the Argentine and Brazilian legislatures had a much larger share of legislators
operating in the venal-parochial mode than the Uruguayan legislature, which had a large
share of legislators operating in a programmatic-workable mode.

This analysis suggests that the success of a policy in Congress is dependent on
two variables: first, the number of legislators in each mode and second, the success of
the executive in meeting the demands of legislators in the venal-parochial and workable
modes. The different results of executive support for neoliberal reforms in Argentina
and Brazil stem from the second variable: Menem satisfied the venal-parochial desires
of his legislature more successfully than did Collor and Cardoso. The variation between
Argentina/Brazil and Uruguay, however, appears to be a function of the first variable.
This raises the question of why the venal-parochial factions in Argentina and Brazil
were so much larger than that of Uruguay. Here, legislative malapportionment could
prove particularly important.

Neoliberal Reforms
Neoliberal reforms present an excellent opportunity for us to compare executivelegislative relations since the agenda was universal for each country and executives
were nearly universally supportive of them by the 1990s. In this section I examine how
well leading theories explain the implementation of reforms in my three cases.
Scholars have already thoroughly examined the content of “The Washington
Consensus” (Williamson 1994) as well as the degree to which different countries
enacted it. A more diverse set of theories explain why presidents in those countries—
often times led by populist leaders who won office campaigning against
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neoliberalism—almost universally chose to enact deep, painful reforms.

These

explanations include international financial institutions using debt to push adoption of
reforms (Stallings 1992; Vacs 1994), domestic elites cooperating with international
elites out of a shared belief in neoliberalism (Teichman 2001), and hyperinflation
increasing the appetite for radical change (Weyland 2002). These three explanations
placed together offer a compelling explanation for the almost universal support for
neoliberal reform among Latin American executives in the 1990s.
Nevertheless, support for neoliberal reforms among Latin American legislatures
was much less universal among Latin American congresses. Venezuelan President
Pérez’s neoliberal reforms led to nowhere except his own impeachment while President
Menem reshaped the Argentine state and the axis of political debate within his first
term. As a result of the plethora of single and comparative studies explaining the
success or failure of the passage of neoliberal reforms in legislatures, the literature on
this topic in Latin America is vast. I will confine my overview to the literature that
affects my cases.
Haggard and Kaufman (1995) find that two institutional variables influenced
enactment of economic reforms in emerging democracies. First, executive authority
could allow the president to move around a recalcitrant legislature (163-168).
Nevertheless, they found it insufficient when the second variable was lacking: a stable,
cohesive party system instead of a fragmented, polarized one (170-181). The former,
argue Haggard and Kaufman, creates political competition for the center, allowing
parties to act pragmatically instead of painting themselves into an ideological corner.
This proved true in the Brazilian case since several parties unable to discipline members
dominated Congress. President Collor attempted to govern around this ungovernable
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Congress by decree while President Cardoso, using a combination of decrees and
skilled negotiating, passed important reforms but still encountered difficulties by the
end of his term.
Applying this analysis to Argentina, they find that Menem used decrees
extensively and also managed to maintain his political base through his strong
connections to the Peronist Party. Haggard and Kaufman are less clear about why the
Peronist Party stayed with Menem, since it had had a strong programmatic element,
only saying that “advantages” kept them within the party. Numerous other studies
(Levitsky 2003; Hwang and Jones 2004) make clear that these advantages were the
federal resources that fuel clientelism and patronage in the provinces.

Levitsky

demonstrates that though the Peronist Party was not a purely pragmatic party when
Menem took office—as Haggard and Kaufman argue is crucial for neoliberal reform—
he transformed it into one (2003).
The Uruguayan case, however, proves difficult for Haggard and Kaufman’s
theory. Uruguay, with its strong, pragmatic party system should have easily enacted
neoliberal policies but it did not. Although President Sanguinetti used his executive
powers to limit the size of the budget and set public-sector salaries (Haggard and
Kaufman 1995, 217), he still could not implement reforms as strong as those in
Argentina. Haggard and Kaufman point to Uruguay’s public referendum as the reason
for its slow approach, using the example of an increase in social security benefits that
had been approved by referendum that made the government’s efforts to privatize the
system (1995, 218). As important role the referendum has had in shaping Uruguayan
public policies, it cannot explain the failure of four relatively modest reforms of the
social security in the legislature after the referendum (Blake 1998, 12). O’Donnell
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argues that the reason President Sanguinetti never enacted a neoliberal “package” like in
Argentina and Brazil not because of the referendum, but because “the elements of
secrecy and surprise that seem so fundamental to...packages are de facto eliminated” by
a strong Congress (O’Donnell 1994).

Uruguay’s referendum system certainly

prevented presidents from enacting unpopular neoliberal reforms, but a strong
congressional role did as well. Executive powers and party systems do not explain
presidents’ mediocre success in passing reforms through Congress in Uruguay.
Weyland gives another explanation for the differing successes of executives. He
argues that the worse the economic crisis, the more support exists for painful and risky
reforms (Weyland 2002, 252). Argentina and Peru’s deep economic crises meant that
executives could push reform farther than in Brazil, where the crisis was not as
profound, and especially in Venezuela, which had not experienced hyperinflation.
Applying this explanation to the Uruguayan case, however, proves problematic.
Although Uruguay did not experience the particularly destabilizing effects of
hyperinflation like its neighbors, the military regime saw the real GDP decline by a
sixth in its last two years, unemployment rise to 13%, and inflation reached a high if not
hyper level of 72% the year it left office. The unrest that this economic crisis fomented
was a key factor in the overthrow of the military regime—making it sufficiently
disruptive to argue that Uruguay had entered the “domain of losses” that Weyland
argues is the driver behind the enactment of neoliberal reforms (Haggard and Kaufman,
48-49). Nevertheless, Uruguay’s first post-transition president, Sanguinetti, could not
pass the majority of his reforms beyond trade liberalization through a Congress resistant
to change. According to Weyland’s theory, the opposite should have been the case in
Uruguay—that there should have been widespread support for change to escape the
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domain of losses. Uruguay thus proves a problematic exception to both Haggard and
Kaufman, and Weyland’s theories of implementation of neoliberal reforms.

Sacrificing Democracy for Economic Reform
What becomes clear from an analysis of the Argentine and Brazilian congresses
during the period of economic reforms is that they did not fulfill their obligations as the
legislative branch—thus harming the quality of democracy in these newly reemerging
polyarchies.

Why were these congresses such minor players in the debates over

structural adjustments?
One theory posits that high rates of legislative turnover explain the inactive
legislature. While studies of the U.S. Congress have shown that legislators’ ambitions
are “static” (Schlesinger 1966), that is they plan to stay and build careers there,
legislators in Latin America usually display “progressive ambition,” planning to build
careers outside of Congress (Morgenstern 2002, 13-17). This progressive ambition is
showcased in low levels of reelection: only 43% of legislators sought reelection and
won in the 1995 Brazilian election while the number was 17% in the 1997 Argentine
election (Altman and Chasquetti, 2005). Spiller and Tommasi argue that in Argentina,
“legislators have little incentive to specialize, to acquire policy expertise or to develop
strong congressional institutions” since so many plan to serve only one term which is a
prime cause for congress’s weak policy role (2006, 53). Ames argues similarly that
Brazilian deputies “find it better to concentrate on delivering pork to their districts” than
concentrate on acquiring legislative or policy skills since they will not build their
careers in the institution (2002, 142).
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Although a connection between congressional weakness and high turnover rates
makes sense, Uruguayan reelection rates should give us pause.

The Uruguayan

Congress is the strongest in South America, but its reelection rates are only slightly
better than Brazil’s: 47% ended up returning to office in 1999 as opposed to 43% in
Brazil in 1995 (Altman and Chasquetti, 2005). Thus high turnover rates and short time
horizons for Argentine and Brazilian legislators are poor explanations for their weak
roles in policy formulation since this relationship does not exist in Uruguay.
Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler argue that Latin America has never been able to
liberalize economically and politically at the same time because that the region’s strong
socioeconomic inequalities have prevented the emergence of a strong civil society, a
key mediator between the two (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1999, 15). This helps explain
the use of decrees that pushed constitutional limits in the implementation of farreaching reforms as opposed to more democratic statutes in Argentina and Brazil.
Moreover, legislators’ venal-parochial behaviors are less “democratic” than workable
behaviors since they in effect allow the president to do as he wishes, only limiting him
by their demands. However, this theory does not immediately explain the different
outcomes in Argentina and Uruguay since their levels of inequality during the 1980s
(when the countries set on their different courses), as measured by the Gini coefficient,
were similar: 43.65 for Uruguay in 1981 and 44.51 for Argentina in 1986 (World Bank
2007).
However, legislative malapportionment may help explain this discrepancy. As
they point out in a footnote, there exist important subnational socioeconomic
inequalities as well (39 fn 8). Since poor, rural areas with low levels of civil society
and economic equality are overrepresented in the Argentine Congress, combining
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Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler’s theory of civil society with a closer analysis of the effects
of legislative malapportionment may go a long way in helping explain this difference
between Argentina and Uruguay.

Legislative Malapportionment
Although malapportionment has been a long recognized feature of legislatures,
scholars have only recently begun to study it in depth. What follows is a two-part
literature review on the subject: the first part analyzing how malapportioned my cases
are, the second engaging the more recent literature that analyzes its affects in Argentina,
Brazil, and Latin America.

Measuring Legislative Malapportionment
Samuels and Snyder developed the first comparative measure of legislative
malapportionment by taking “the absolute value of the difference between every
district’s seat and population share, addi[ing] them, and then divid[ing] by two” for
every legislature in the world (2001b, 655). This gives scholars an interval measure of
legislative malapportionment and allows for a more detailed cross-national analysis of
malapportionment than before.
Samuels and Snyder find that Argentina has the most malapportioned upper
house and 16th most malapportioned lower house.

There also exists an important

socioeconomic component to this malapportionment as well: the five most developed
provinces hold 70% of the population and 78% of the industrial production but only
21% of Senate and 55% of Chamber seats (Gibson, Calvo, Falleti, 2004).

The

combination of heavy malapportionment and the underrepresentation of the most
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developed sections exists in Brazil as well. Samuels and Snyder find it has the second
most malapportioned upper house and 18th most malapportioned lower house in the
world. The developed Southeast makes up of 42.7% of the population but only held
34.9% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies while the less developed North held
6.8% of the population but 11.1% of seats in 1997. During the mid-1990s, the six most
developed states held 58.3% of the population and produced 79.7% of the GDP—but
only held 48% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Selcher 1998, 35). These
discrepancies are even more acute in Senate.

The socioeconomic component to

malapportionment should have important ramifications for the quality of Argentine and
Brazilian democracy as scholars from Lipset (1959) to Pzreworski and Limongi (1997)
have seen wealth as an important determinant of the success on democracy.
Unfortunately, no scholars have measured how much less developed (economically or
socially) overrepresented sections of either country beside the GDP measures
mentioned above or studied its ramifications in more than passing.
The Uruguayan congress, on the other hand exhibits very little legislative
malapportionment. The minimum number of deputies in its lower house is two, which,
especially in a small and densely populated country, produces very little
malapportionment. Uruguay most distinguishes itself from its neighbors in senate
apportionment: whereas the Argentine and Brazilian Senates are the most
malapportioned in the world, the Uruguayan Senate has no malapportionment since it is
elected from a single, national district. Comparing the effects of malapportionment
between Argentina and Brazil on one hand, and Uruguay on the other is thus a fertile
ground for research because of this wide disparity.
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The Study of Legislative Malapportionment
As Samuels and Snyder wrote when they firmly placed legislative
malapportionment on the comparative politics map, the literature on the political
consequences on electoral laws “has largely neglected” malapportionment,

“a

fundamental characteristic of many of the world’s electoral systems” (2001b, 652). It is
curious that so many comprehensive studies of electoral regimes have ignored the
significance

of

malapportionment.

Some

studies

had

found

legislative

malapportionment undemocratic, declaring it a violation of Dahl’s “one person, one
vote” principle (Gudgin and Taylor 1979; Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 17-18), but not
analyzed its effects beyond strictly normative considerations.3 Since 2001, however, a
number of studies have been either dedicated to studying the effects of legislative
malapportionment on policy or have integrated it into a larger study.
As the most heavily malapportioned region, scholarship on legislative
malapportionment on Latin America has been particularly fruitful. In “Devaluating the
Vote in Latin America,” Samuels and Snyder go beyond criticizing the violation of “one
man, one vote” to a more detailed examination of the negative effects of legislative
malapportionment.

First, they find that it strengthens rural conservatives in Latin

America since the areas of the country they control are overrepresented, thus creating
“distortions in the ideological biases of legislatures” (2001a, 151). Second, it creates an
“estrangement between the legislative and executive branches” because in nations like
Argentina and Brazil a presidential candidate can win with an urban coalition, but have
a hard time assembling a governing coalition due to the rural orientation of Latin
American legislatures. Third, it holds the president hostage to rural interests since he or

3

For a list of the pre-2001 literature, see Samuels and Snyder 2001, 652.
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she must “buy” their support through pork barrel payoffs.

Fourth, it allows

“subnational authoritarian enclaves” in the periphery to fend off successfully attempts
by the center to remove oligarchic control.
Samuels and Snyder also find that some of these effects were the intended
consequences of electoral reforms under military and populist regimes, which regarded
voters as “pragmatic” in the periphery than in the urban metro, and thus increased their
electoral strength.

The politically heterogeneous center threatened both types of

regimes: the key opponents to military rule, the student and labor movements, as well as
the main opponents to populism, the middle class, were heavily concentrated in cities in
the metropolitan areas. Even though the militaries and populist regimes were bitter
enemies in both countries, the pragmatism of caudillos in the periphery meant that they
would always support the government in power—which military and populist regimes
always expected to be.

Country-Specific Studies
Argentina is the country where the study of malapportionment’s effects have
gone the farthest, which is not surprising since it is the most malapportioned country.
Calvo et. al (2001) find that malapportionment leads to a “partisan bias” in Argentina
that favors Peronism since Peronists tend to perform much better electorally in the
periphery than in the urban center, making it inherently difficult for a non-Peronist
president to win legislative support.
Moving beyond the effects of malapportionment on partisan composition,
Gibson and Calvo (2000) analyze the role of legislative malapportionment in the
passage of structural reforms in the 1990s. They find that Menem was able to maintain
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a strong legislative coalition while significantly cutting jobs in the public sector by
concentrating them in the underrepresented urban provinces and leaving the
overrepresented periphery relatively untouched as well as providing a disproportionate
amount of discretionary funds to peripheral provinces to win the support of their
congressional delegations. They dub these lightly populated districts “low-maintenance
constituencies” since they provide a large amount of votes for relatively little federal
resources. This finding helps us reconceive our notions of neoliberalism in the 1990s:
Menem seems to have limited neoliberalism to metropolitan provinces while leaving
peripheral provinces relatively unreformed. Instead of pursuing the difficult course of
convincing a legislature to approve unpopular reforms, he faced the much more
manageable task of convincing some legislators to cause pain for other legislators’
constituents and not their own. To date this is the only article that directly examines the
effects of malapportionment on neoliberal reform in Argentina.
The literature on malapportionment in Brazil is far less extensive than the
literature on Argentina. Fleischer (1994) gives a detailed account of the deliberate use
of malapportionment by populist and military regimes in the mid-twentieth century to
underrepresent the regions where opposition to them was greatest. Other scholars
mention malapportionment as a normative problem or as a source of conservative bias
but do not go farther (Selcher 1998; Hunter 2003; Mainwaring and Samuels 2004).
More relevant for my study, Ames finds that one in five votes in the 1987 constitutional
convention, including whether the president would have a four or five year term, would
have gone differently if delegates had voted the same way but their votes had been
weighed based on the population of their states (Ames 2002b, 55). However, he admits
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that the omission of the senate in his analysis likely underplays the role of
malapportionment because of how much more malapportioned it is than the chamber.
These studies aside, there still remain important gaps in the study of legislative
malapportionment in Argentina and Brazil as well as in the rest of South America (only
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay are not significantly malapportioned). First, although
Samuels and Snyder have identified overrepresented regions as generally poorer and
with more authoritarian political cultures, no study has probed how much poorer and
less developed they are—a line of inquiry I pursue in the next chapter. Second, scholars
still have not applied Calvo and Gibson (2000)’s concept of “low-maintenance
constituencies” beyond public sector jobs and discretionary spending in Argentina. Did
Argentine presidents similarly distribute other public goods more heavily in lightly
populated districts? Did they do so in Brazil? This latter question I seek to resolve.
Finally, nobody has studied in depth what happens when a legislature in Latin America
is not malapportioned like Uruguay. Does this lead to substantially different outcomes
than in the more normal, malapportioned legislatures? My study will address these gaps
in this growing body of literature.

Conclusion
As comparative politics scholars better understand legislative malapportionment,
it is crucial that we integrate it into past findings and assumptions. Some of the
literature listed above, especially Gibson and Calvo (2000) have significantly altered
how we perceive the policy outcomes of these congresses. There exist portions of the
literature on democracy in Latin America that could benefit from study of the role of
legislative malapportionment where little has already done.
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My study seeks to use legislative malapportionment as an explanation for why
the Uruguayan Congress was workable in the 1980s and 1990s while the Argentine and
Brazilian Congresses were venal-parochial. No study has satisfactorily explained why
the Uruguayan Congress was so much more active in policy formulation than its
counterparts, much less explained it through legislative malapportionment. Moreover,
since legislative malapportionment is a significant feature of Latin American
congresses, it is crucial that we understand the workings of one of the few congresses
without it. Which of the common characterizations of Latin American congresses
(venal, parochial, uninterested in policy, etc.) stem from “Iberian” influences as
Teichman (2001) describes them or from this one feature?
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Chapter 3: Measuring the Divide—How Do the Nations the
Argentine and Brazilian Congresses Represent Differ from
the Nations they Serve?
A crucial aspect of Argentine and Brazilian political geography is the division
between the metropolitan area and the periphery. These are vast countries with mega
city, jungle, desert, tundra, and plains, but population, wealth, and urbanization are not
spread equally. The metropolitan areas of both countries contain the majority of all
three, leaving a relatively small amount for the periphery. The overrepresentation of
less populated states/provinces in both countries is also the overrepresentation of the
periphery because those states tend to be less populated. If the periphery and metro
diverge significantly in the socioeconomic factors that influence democratic
governance, then malapportionment will also have a significant effect on democratic
governance.
The socioeconomic differences between the metro and the periphery figure
prominently in the literature on malapportionment of Argentina and Brazil. O’Donnell
famously divides Latin American countries into “blue” areas in the urban centers with a
high degree of penetration by a liberal democratic state and “brown” areas in the
periphery where the liberal democratic state fails to penetrate territorially or
functionally. He mentions in passing that brown areas “in many cases...are heavily
over-represented in the national legislatures” (1993, 11).

Referring to Argentina,

Gibson and Calvo call the constituencies and political networks “labor-based,
economically strategic, and mobilizational in the metropolis [and] clientelistic, poor,
and conservative in the periphery” (1997, 2). None of these studies actually measured

43

the socioeconomic differences between the metro and the periphery in either country,
however, most likely because they are apparent to even the most casual observers of
either country. Selcher goes the farthest in examining the U.N. Human Development
Index scores, a composite measure of health, education, and wealth, of the five
Brazilian administrative regions (1998).
This chapter will measure the differences between the metro and the periphery
on measures that have important effects on democratic governance. Chapters 4 and 5
go into detail about why they matter. By looking at predictors of democratic success
instead of evaluating the quality of democracy itself in each of the states/provinces, I
may lose some measure of accuracy since I am not measuring the variable directly.
However, I obtain precision since the predictors are very exact (census numbers of
highest educational level of attainment for example) and a focus on predictors provides
a causal explanation for these differences. I focus on predictors of civil society size
because Chapter 4 focuses on civil society.
The three predictors I look at are education, economic inequality, and the U.N.
Human Development Index.

Education is “the best individual-level predictor of

political participation” (Putnam 1995, 68) and is the area “where governments probably
have the greatest direct ability to generate social capital” (Fukuyama 1999). Inequality
influences civil society in two ways. First, inequality in developing nations like those
discussed here often means high levels of poverty, which makes civil society
participation more difficult (Pereira 1993). Second, extreme inequality divides society
to such an extent that the necessary solidarity for civil society to grow does not exist
(Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1999). Finally, I use the U.N. Human Development Index,
which is a composite of per capita GDP, education levels, literacy, and health. In their
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study of European civil society, Bartkowsi and Jasínska-Kania find a positive
correlation between HDI and group membership (2004) and Anheier uses it as a part of
his cross-national measure of civil society development (1998). I will use HDI more
extensively than the other two measures since it already takes education into account
and is more standardized between my cases (complete educational data on the
department level in Uruguay does not exist, Gini coefficients are not available for
Argentina and Uruguayan subnational units, and the “unfulfilled basic needs” measure
used in censuses do not have the same criteria in all three countries). Importantly,
education and equality affect democratic governance independently of civil society for
reasons explained in the next chapter and thus are important to measure for their own
sake.
This chapter has two objectives. First it will measure the difference between
metropolitan and peripheral provinces on HDI, education, and inequality. In the next
chapter, I explain the significance of these differences, but for now it is important to
examine whether they exist. Second, it will measure how much the Argentine and
Brazilian legislatures overrepresent less developed areas as well as compare their
development levels with Uruguay.

Economic and Human Development Differences in Argentina
In deciding which provinces fall into the metro and the periphery, I use the
definition used by Gibson and Calvo (2000) and Samuels and Snyder (2004). They
place the Federal Capital and the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, and
Santa Fé into the metro. These are the five most populous provinces and they have the
highest overall GDPs. They held 24 million of Argentina’s 36 million residents, or 67
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percent in the 2001 Census. The periphery consists of all the other provinces with 12
million residents, or 33 percent. This distinction is useful because the regions are
geographically contiguous and all federal legislative representation springs from the
province/state in both countries. Thus an area of a metro province that resembles the
periphery in its population density and its socioeconomic characteristics will receive the
same federal representation per capita as the rest of the province.
What follows is a statistical analysis of the differences between the metro and
the periphery on three measures of human development: U.N. Human Development
Index, education, and poverty. The data are from the Argentine National Institute of
Statistics and Census of Argentina (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Censos or
INDEC). I use data from 1991, just two years after Menem’s election and the beginning
of Argentine neoliberalism, except for the education data since the earliest available
were from 2001. Luckily, the educational levels of a relatively demographically stable
nation like Argentina do not shift as much as income because the over-30 population is
less likely to receive further education. Using the provincial level data of these three
measures, I calculate the mean score of the metro provinces and then the mean score of
the peripheral provinces. Although a weighted average would more accurately reflect
the differences between the metro and the periphery, I am less interested in them than
the differences between the metro and peripheral provinces because federal
representation in both senates and to a lesser extent in the lower houses is based on
territorial representation.

U.N. Human Development Index
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The United Nations’ ranking of Argentine Provinces by Human Development
Index (HDI) provides a general look at the socioeconomic differences between the
metro and periphery.

One third is based on per capita GDP, one third based on

education levels (divided between measures of educational attainment and literacy
rates), and one third based on health. This index is a widely accepted indicator of
international development and can allow us to examine divergences between the metro
and the periphery in an international context. Higher scores indicate higher levels of
human development.
Table 3.1 is a ranking of Argentine provinces by HDI using data from 1991. In
general, provinces in the metro score higher than provinces in the periphery. The
provincial averages make this quite clear: the metro provinces scored an average of 84
while peripheral provinces scored an average of 75. Compared internationally, that
places the metro in 1991 with countries like Singapore, Portugal, and Yugoslavia. The
periphery’s score on the other hand places it with countries like Panama, Cuba, and the
United Arab Emirates.
Although the provincial averages demonstrate a clear developmental divide
between the metro and the periphery, this ranking of provinces by HDI reveals five
peripheral provinces with higher HDI rankings than the lowest metropolitan provinces.
They also performed strongly in subsequent rankings in 1995 and 2000. The average of
this “highly developed periphery” is the same as the average of the metro provinces. By
removing these five provinces from the peripheral average, the rest of the periphery’s
average sinks even lower, creating an 11-point difference between the “less developed
periphery” and the metro/highly-developed periphery. The less developed periphery
falls between Jamaica and Saudi Arabia in its development levels.
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Table 3.1: Argentine
Provinces Ranked by 1991
HDI
Province/Group of
Provinces

1991 HDI

Federal Capital

89.6

Córdoba

84.4

Neuquen

83.8

Tierra del Fuego

83.8

Metro Average

83.66

Santa Cruz
Highly Developed
Periphery Average

83.5
83.5

Chubut

83.2

La Pampa
Province of Buenos
Aires

83.2
82.8

Santa Fe

82

Mendoza

79.5

La Rioja

77.1

Río Negro

76.7

Tucumán

76.1

Catamarca

75.7

San Luís

75.6

Periphery Average

75.02

Entre Rios
Less Developed
Periphery Average

73.8
71.99

Salta

71.3

Misiones

70.3

San Juan

70.3

Santiago del Estero

69.1

Formosa

68.3

Chaco

68

Corrientes

68

Table 3.2: Mean Educational Levels of
Population Over 15 Years Old by
Percentage
At Least At Least
University
None Primary Secondary
Educated
Education Education
Metro
Provinces
Periph.
Provinces
Highly
Dev.
Periph.
Provinces
Less Dev.
Periph.
Provinces

3.0

84.5

58.2

10.7

4.8

77.6

51.4

7.5

3.7

84.1

58.5

8.6

5.2

75.3

48.4

6.9

Source: INDEC, 2001

Table 3.3: Mean Percentage of
Population Living with
Unfulfilled Basic Needs
Metro Provinces

15.1

27.2
Periph. Provinces
Highly Dev. Periph.
18.8
Provinces
Less Dev. Periph.
29.3
Provinces
Source: INDEC, 2001

Jujuy
67.6
Source: U.N. Human Development
Programme, Argentina Human
Development Report, 1991
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Prior characterizations of the Argentine periphery as less developed than the
metro are thus generally correct, but there are five exceptions to this rule. Although
these provinces are lightly populated, malapportionment can transform five small
exceptions five significant caveats: they may hold only 3% of the population, but they
also control 10% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 21% of seats in the Senate. I
will continue with this “highly developed” and “less developed” distinction with the
next two measures, the highly developed periphery consisting of Chubut, La Pampa,
Neuquen, Santa Cruz, and Tierra del Fuego and the less developed periphery consisting
of the rest.

Educational Disparities
Education heavily influences civil society participation, political participation
and the ability to understand the abstract realm of politics as I will describe in Chapter
4. Argentine census data indicates a substantial divide between the different regions of
the country in education. Table 3.2 displays the mean educational attainment levels of
the provinces in each region.4 The metro provinces outperform the peripheral provinces
by about seven percent in primary and secondary education.

On the educational

extremes—no formal education and post-secondary education—the metro provinces
still outperform the peripheral provinces though to a lesser extent than on the two
intermediate levels. Dividing the peripheral provinces into two development level
groups reveals an even more extreme educational divide: the metro provinces and
highly developed provinces are essentially tied on the two intermediate levels, and
about ten percent ahead of the less developed periphery. A clear division in educational
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attainment in Argentina emerges, though not between the metropolitan and the
peripheral provinces as much as between metropolitan and a handful of peripheral
provinces on one end, and the majority of peripheral provinces on the other.

Unfulfilled Basic Needs
Inequality has two potential effects on civil society: in a developing nation, it
increases the number of people living in such poverty that they cannot easily participate
in civil society and it decreases the national solidarity that civil society requires. We
cannot easily compare which group of provinces has more economic inequality than
others since the Gini coefficient, the most commonly used measure of economic
inequality, is not available on the subnational level in Argentina. The closest we can
come is measuring what the Argentine census calls “unfulfilled basic needs” (las
necesidades básicas insatisfechas).5 UBNs use some educational measures (school
attendance and whether the head of household finished third grade), but they are distinct
from the education completion measure I used above and include other variables that
have nothing to do with education. This measure better interacts with the argument that
inequality increases the number of people living in poverty than that of national
solidarity since it is itself a measure of poverty.
Again, the data show an important distinction between the metro and the
periphery: while metro provinces have on average 15 percent of their population with
UBNs, peripheral provinces have 27 percent with UBNs. Dividing the periphery also

5

The definition consists of five variables: Homes that had more than three people per room,
“inconvenient” homes such as shacks in slums, homes without any sort of toilet, school attendance
(whether children between 6 and 12 years old attend school), and sustenance ability (whether homes had
more than four employed people and whether the head of household had completed third grade).
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reveals a nine percent difference between the highly developed periphery and the less
developed periphery in UBNs.

Although some scholars have pointed out the differences between the Argentine metro
and periphery, I am not aware of any study that actually measured these differences or
connected them to literature on civil society. The data in this section demonstrate that
any discussion of poverty and education in Argentina must take regional discrepancies
into account. There is a strong divide between the urban metro and the periphery in
education levels, unsatisfied basic needs, and human development. All of these have
strong effects on civil society and thus civil society should generally be larger and
involve more citizens in the metro than in the periphery. On the other hand, the census
data demonstrate that there exist five well developed provinces in the commonly
defined periphery. They may mitigate how legislative malapportionment shifts the
development levels of the nation the legislature represents. To test whether that is true,
I will measure the size of the less developed bias later in this chapter as well as examine
whether the politics of these provinces is more similar to the rest of the periphery or to
the metro in Chapter 5.
Economic and Human Development Index Differences in Brazil
In this section, I conduct an analysis similar to that of the last section. Although
a clear distinction between the metro and the periphery should appear, it should be less
strong than in Argentina due to the massive urban poverty in Brazil. Early in the 20th
century the difference between the two areas may have been stronger, but the
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immigration of the poor from the North and Northeast of the country throughout the 20th
century lessened this disparity.
The states that make up the Brazilian metro and the periphery are wellestablished as shown by Selcher (1998) and Samuels and Snyder (2004). Brazil places
its states into administrative regions—South, Southeast, North, Northeast, and CenterWest—with the first two making up the commonly defined metro and the latter three
making up the periphery. The use of regions as opposed to individual states may not be
as effective as individual states (like I did in Argentina) since there are some
overrepresented states in the legislature that lie in the metro (Santa Catarina and
Espírito Santo).

According to the 2000 census, the metro contained 97 million

Brazilians, or 57 percent, and the periphery contained 72 million or 43 percent. I use
Brazilian census data on administrative regions and states provided by the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (O Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
or IBGE).

U.N. Human Development Index
Table 3.4 displays a ranking by state of HDI scores in Brazil (the states are color
coded by region to give the reader a visual sense of regional divisions). As with
Argentina, the Brazilian metro and periphery are wide apart in their HDI scores with a
ten-point gap between them. Whereas the metro displays development levels similar to
those of Panama, Jamaica, and Cuba, the peripheries scores place it near China, Sri
Lanka, and Paraguay. The developmental distinction between the metro and periphery
in Brazil has obvious validity. On the other hand, there exist important complications to
it. First, the Center-West provinces tie with the South and Southeast provinces despite
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being part of the commonly defined periphery. During the 1960s the capital of Brazil
was moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília in the Center-West to promote development
in the Brazilian interior. Today, Brasília scores the highest in HDI and may have
succeeded in spurring development in the Center-West.

Perhaps scholars should

question the categorization of the Center-West as a peripheral region. Second, two
provinces in the North (Roraima and Amapá) perform better than the lowest scoring
metro province, Espírito Santo. I combine these two provinces with the Center-West to
create a Brazilian “highly developed periphery,” the rest of the periphery falling into a
“less developed periphery.

As in Argentina, these exceptions to the rule of less

development in the periphery are significant when combined with the effects of
malapportionment: they hold 11% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 26% of
Senate seats.
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Table 3.4: Brazilian States
Ranked by 1991 HDI
6

State or Groups of States

1991
HDI

Distrito Federal
79.9
São Paulo
77.8
Rio Grande do Sul
75.3
Rio de Janeiro
75.3
Santa Catarina
74.8
Metro
73.3
South East
73
Center West
72.5
Mato Grosso do Sul
71.6
Developed Periphery
71.4
Paraná
71.1
Goiás
70
Minas Gerais
69.7
Roraima
69.2
Amapá
69.1
Espírito Santo
69
Mato Grosso
68.5
Rondônia
66
North
65.6
Pará
65
Periphery
63.6
Acre
62.4
Pernambuco
62
Tocantins
61.1
Rio Grande do Norte
60.4
Less Developed Periphery 60.2
Sergipe
59.7
Ceará
59.3
Bahia
59
Northeast
58
Piauí
56.6
Paraíba
56.1
Alagoas
54.8
Maranhão
54.3
Source: U.N. Development
Programme, Report on Human
Development in Brazil, 1991

Table 3.5: Mean Educational Levels of Population
Over 15 Years Old by Percentage

Region
Metro
Provinces
Periph.
Provinces
Highly
Developed
Periph.
Provinces
Less
Developed
Periph.
Provinces

At Least At Least At Least
Primary Secondary Bachelor's
No Education Education Education Degree
9.8
38.7
24.5
7.4
21.6

30.7

19.5

4.5

14.2

38.9

24.8

6.7

22.8

29.0

18.3

3.9

Source: IBGE, 2000

Table 3.6: Mean Gini
Coefficients by Region
Gini
Coefficient
(2000)
51.8
54.1

Region
Metro States
Periph. States
Highly
Developed
54.5
Periph. States
Less
Developed
Periph. States
54.0
SourceL IBGE, 2000

6

States are color coded by region to give a visual impression of how well regions conform to the metroperiphery distinction. Blue is South, red is Southeast, yellow is Center-West, green is North, pink is
Noutheast
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Educational Disparities
Table 3.5 illustrates the differences in education level among the regions. The
most significant educational disparity between the metropolitan and peripheral
provinces is that 12% less citizens on average received any formal education in the
peripheral provinces than in the metropolitan provinces. The difference is not as strong,
but quite notable in primary education with 8%, and weaker on secondary education
with 5%.

The highly developed and less developed distinction carries over into

education: the highly developed peripheral provinces have a medium position (14%)
between the metro provinces (10%) and the less developed peripheral provinces (23%)
on the percentage of the population with no education. On the other measures, their
educational levels are similar to the metro provinces.
Varying Economic Inequality
Unlike in Argentina, a significant portion of Brazil’s poverty is urban as the
favelas outside of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro demonstrate. The IBGE calculates Gini
coefficients, the measure of economic inequality, by state and region.

The Gini

coefficient measures the distribution of wealth in a country, assigning a value of one for
a country in which all wealth is held by one person and a value of zero for a country
when all wealth is distributed evenly. As opposed to the Unfulfilled Basic Need
measure used in Argentina, the Gini coefficient better illustrates a lack of national
solidarity than the portion living in poverty. Table 3.6 displays the Gini coefficients of
the regions and the metro/periphery—although high economic inequality in a nation
with as low of a per capita GDP as Brazil ($10,763 in 2006) means a high percentage
live in poverty.

There is a noticeable if not overwhelming three-point difference

between the metro and the periphery.

Applying the highly developed and less
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developed distinction does not make a difference: the highly developed periphery even
scores half a point higher, indicating more inequality. Although other measures show a
clear difference between these developmental regions, inequality is not simply a
regional problem, but a national one as well. Inequality should thus limit civil society
development in both regions, although in the periphery more than the metro.

Brazil exhibits important regional divisions between a well-developed metro and a less
developed periphery. On education and human development, the difference is even
more substantial than that in Argentina since the low scores are much lower in Brazil.
On economic equality, both regions exhibit substantial problems—but the periphery
clearly more. Scholars have already examined how much the periphery in both nations
is overrepresented. This and the previous section demonstrate that the metro and the
periphery in both countries are virtually different countries in terms of predictors of
civil society development.

Separating Representation and Governance
A perfectly apportioned legislature represents the entire nation as well as
governs it. Malapportionment divides these two tasks. The legislature represents a
distorted version of the nation while governing the nation itself.

In the cases of

Argentina and Brazil, the legislatures represent a less developed, less educated, and less
equal nation than the nation they govern. If development, education, and equality affect
democratic governance—including congress challenging the executive on national
policy—then the legislature will underperform in relation to how developed the nation
may be. Scholars have already noted the bias in favor of less-developed areas in Latin
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America (O’Donnell 1993; Samuels and Snyder 2004), but have not measured how
much the population congress represents is less developed than the population at
large.

This is especially necessary since this chapter proved the existence of a

significant number of peripheral provinces that match the metropolitan provinces on
these measures.
In this section, I measure the difference between the nation the legislatures
represent and the nation they serve. I calculate the HDI of the legislatures by ranking
provinces/states by HDI and calculate the HDI of the constituency of the median, 25th
percentile, and 75th percentile deputy or senator. As a point of comparison, I do the
same calculation of a perfectly apportioned congress. All data are from 1991, an
important time since it was around then that the different economic reform packages
began to take effect. The population data I used to calculate the single multi-member
district are from the Argentine and Brazilian censuses. The Argentine and Brazilan
HDI data are from their respective 1991 U.N. Development Program Reports.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 display the results.

In neither case does lower house

malapportionment significantly change the median legislator’s HDI.

Upper-house

malapportionment, however, causes a 6.4 point drop in Argentina and 3.6 point drop in
Brazil.

The district of the Argentine median legislator in a perfectly apportioned

chamber would have placed 43rd in international HDI rankings while the median senator
would have placed 54th. The district of the Brazilian median legislator in a perfectly
apportioned chamber would have placed 66th and the median senator placed 74th. These
are important if not overwhelming differences.
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Table 3.7:Argentina HDI
Analysis
Median

Hypothetical
Perfect
Apportionment
83

Chamber of
Deputies
83

Senate
76

68-77
77-83
83
82-90

68-76
76-83
83
83-90

68-70
70-76
76-83
83-90

1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
Number of Senators (Percent)
below 75
Number of Deputies (Percent)
below 75
Number of Senators (Percent)
above 8
Number of Deputies (Percent)
above 8

176 (68.6%)

157
(61.1%)

Table 3.8: Brazilian HDI
Analysis

Hypothetical
Perfect
Apportionment

Chamber of
Deputies

Senate

70
54-62
62-70
70-75
75-80

69
54-61
61-69
69-75
75-80

66
54-60
60-66
66 -70
70.6-79.9

Median
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
Number of Senators (Percent)
below 65
Number of Deputies (Percent)
below 65
Number of Senators (Percent)
above 75
Number of Deputies (Percent)
above 75

9 (19.7%)
51 (19.7%)

18 (37.5%)
61 (23.7%)

33 (68.6%)

18 (37.5)

24 (33%)
170 (33%)

33 (41%)
167 (33%)

30 (38%)
192( 38%)

4 (5%)
155 (30%)
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As I argued in Chapter 2, however, legislatures are not unitary actors and
scholars must also analyze how large particular factions may be. As instructive as the
median legislator is, an examination of how many seats certain factions grouped by HDI
gain or lose from malapportionment can further show its effects. This analysis shows
that the Argentine Congress assigns areas with an HDI under 75 18 percent more senate
seats and 4 percent more chamber seats than they would receive in a perfectly
apportioned congress. Even more dramatically, it assigns areas with an HDI above 80
31 percent less senate seats and 8% less chamber seats.

In Brazil, the

overrepresentation of the least developed provinces is not as strong: provinces under 65
gain 8 percent more seats in the senate and actually lose .6 percent of seats in the
Chamber. However, the underrepresentation of the most developed provinces is equally
as large as in Argentina: provinces over 75 lose 32.6 percent of these seats they would
have in a perfectly proportioned senate and 7.3 percent of the seats they would have in a
perfectly proportioned chamber.

Uruguay: The Argentine and Brazilian Metro Areas Unattached?
Uruguay exhibits remarkable demographic, cultural, and economic similarities
to the Argentine and Brazilian metros.

First, they all lie within close geographic

proximity to one another: the Argentine metro lies along the Northeast coast, the
Brazilian metro along the Southeast coast, and Uruguay lies between the two. Second,
all experienced large amounts of Southern European immigration during the 19th and
20th centuries. This area became the center of European settlement in the region as
opposed to the predominately indigenous Amazon, heavily African Brazilian Northeast,
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or lightly populated mestizo hinterlands of Argentina. The Brazilian metro became
more diverse during the middle twentieth century as many Afro-Brazilians left the
North and Northeast for the favelas of the metro. Nevertheless, the metro is where
Southern European influence in Brazil is most pronounced. Third, these areas have
been historically more closely integrated into the world market because of their
proximity to the Atlantic Ocean and temperate climates attractive to Europeans. Instead
of depending mostly on the extraction of natural resources for material wealth, they
were involved with their export and later became the centers of industrial production.
Fourth, the metro is where most of the middle class of Argentina and Brazil lie while
Uruguay is mostly a middle class nation.
Uruguay lies entirely within this metro region and is in many ways equivalent of
the Brazilian and especially the Argentine metro without the periphery attached. Figure
3.1 is a map of the Uruguayan HDI by department and demonstrates that although
Montevideo clearly has the highest HDI, no department has anywhere near the low
HDIs that exists in the Argentine and Brazilian peripheries.
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Figure 3.1 Map of Uruguayan Departments by Human development Index
Source: “Desarollo humano en Uruguay,” U.N. Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Carribean and U.N. Development Programme, 2001.
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Tables 3.9 and 3.10 display the Uruguayan Congress’s HDI scores alongside the
scores of the Argentine and Brazilian congresses. Like the Argentine and Brazilian
data, the Uruguayan data are from 1991. I placed the figures for the Uruguayan senate
and chamber together (which is called the “General Assembly” in Uruguay) since
results are the same as perfect apportionment: the senate is elected through a national
multimember district and although the minimum of two deputies per department could
potentially cause the Chamber of Representatives to differ from the national
multimember district, the malapportionment is so light that it had no effects on where
the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile legislators fell.
The most significant comparison is that between Argentina and Uruguay since
Uruguay’s congress’s HDI scores are similar to a non-malapportioned Argentine
congress. Their median legislators are within .03 of one another and the middle 50%
range is similar: 76.9-82.1 for Uruguay and 76.7-82.8 for Argentina. Since Argentina
possesses stronger regional HDI disparities than Uruguay, the lower quartile of a nonmalapportioned congress is quite a bit lower. On the other hand, only 20% of the
Argentine population resided in provinces below the lowest scoring Uruguayan
department. Moreover, more than 25% of the Argentine population lived in provinces
with a higher HDI than the highest scoring Uruguayan department. Thus a large
majority of a non-malapportioned Argentine Congress in 1991 should have acted
similarly to the Uruguayan Congress since it would have been subject to strong civil
society pressure.

Malapprortionment more than regional inequalities affected the

differences between the Argentine Congress’s HDI scores and those of the Uruguayan
Congress.
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Table 3.9:
Argentina
and Uruguay
Compared
Median
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
Number of
Senators
(Percent) above
80
Number of
Deputies
(Percent) above
80

Table 3.10
Brazil and
Uruguay
Compared
Median
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

Actual
Argentine
Chamber of
Deputies
83
68-76
76-83
83
83-90

Uruguayan General
Assembly
80
74-77
77-80
80-82
82

Hypothetical
Argentine Perfect
Apportionment
83
68-77
77-83
83
83-90

18 (61)

33 (69)

60 (61)

176 (69)

157 (61)

Uruguayan General
Assembly
80
74-77
77-80
80-82
82

Hypothetical
Brazilian Perfect
Apportionment
70
54-62
62-70
70-75
75-80

Actual
Brazilian
Chamber of
Deputies
70
54-61
61-70
70-75
75-80

Actual
Argentine
Senate
76
68-70
70-76
76-83
83-90
18 (38)

Actual
Brazilian
Senate
66
54-60
60-66
66-71
71-80
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All regions of Brazil, on the other hand, perform significantly worse on the HDI
than Uruguay. Even a correctly apportioned congress does not raise the national HDI to
levels close to those of Uruguay and all states except Brasília fall below the Uruguayan
median legislator’s district. Although a perfectly apportioned Brazilian Congress would
certainly give areas with higher levels of civil society more representation and thus
improve the democratic functioning of the congress, it still would not rival the
Uruguayan Congress in playing a strong role in policy implementation.

Thus

malapportionment moved the Brazilian Congress away from acting like the Uruguayan
Congress but was not the principal roadblock as in Argentina.

Conclusion
This chapter had two objectives: first, to measure the distance between the metro
and the periphery on development, education and equality, and second to measure the
distance between the nations the legislatures serve and represent on development. It
found that scholars have been correct in supposing a sizeable difference between the
metro and the periphery on demographic predictors of the viability of democracy,
although the gap between the Brazilian metro and peripheral provinces on economic
inequality is not very large. Importantly, it also found significant exceptions in the
periphery to the underperformance on these predictors. Dubbing these exceptions the
highly developed periphery, their effect on congressional strength will be measured in
the Chapter 5. Uruguay, however, does not have as powerful of regional inequalities as
the other two countries.
I argue that malapportionment creates an important distinction between the
nation a legislature represents and the one it governs. I find that the nations the
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legislatures represent are less developed than the nations they govern—despite the
existence of highly developed peripheries. I compare the legislatures side by side with
Uruguay, a nation that lacks a strong metro/periphery distinction in development levels
as well as legislative malapportionment. A perfectly apportioned Argentine legislature
would represent a similar nation to that of the Uruguayan Congress but
malapportionment places the actual Argentine Congress’s development levels much
lower than those of Uruguay. A perfectly apportioned Brazilian legislature and the
Uruguayan Congress would not be at comparable development levels, but are closer
than the actual Brazilian Congress and the Uruguayan Congress are. This chapter
provides an empirical basis for the observation that malapportionment overrepresents
the less developed sections of countries while also proving that some important
exceptions exist. Chapter 4 will examine the implications of the former and Chapter 5
will examine those of the latter.
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Chapter 4: The Hall of Mirrors and the Overrepresentation of
Poverty
Democratically elected executives can implement economic reforms in an
exclusive or inclusive manner. An exclusive manner means that the executive branch
formulates and implements economic reforms with little input from other actors (the
legislature and civil society being the other two main actors). An inclusive manner, on
the other hand, entails the legislature and civil society exercising a strong influence in
the formulation and implementation of economic reforms, forcing the executive to
moderate them if they lack public support. Ducatenzeiler and Oxhorn (1999) argue that
the strength of civil society determines how inclusive or exclusive economic reforms
are. In a nation with a representative legislature, we can assume that a strong civil
society will force executives to include its concerns. However, if a nation possesses
strong geographic differences in civil society development and the legislature
overrepresents certain portions of the country, the civil society and inclusion connection
must be modified.

The legislature, as “the people’s branch” in a three-branch

government, is crucial to the ability of civil society to make economic reforms inclusive
or exclusive.

If areas with a strong civil society are overrepresented, then the

inclusivity of economic reforms could be higher than the nation’s levels of civil society
would predict. If, on the other hand, areas with weak civil society are overrepresented,
then the inclusivity could be lower than the nation’s levels of civil society would
predict.
In this section, I argue that the latter causal process occurred in Argentina and
Brazil during the 1990s due to regional variation of civil society strength and
overrepresentation of areas with weak civil society as demonstrated in the last chapter.
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On the other hand, Uruguay’s combination of a relatively strong civil society across the
country and no overrepresentation of the areas that perform the worst meant an
inclusive process of economic reform, as Ducatenzeiler and Oxhorn’s theory would
predict.
At first glance, some might argue that the overrepresentation of subnational
units with a poorer and less educated public might be an effective way of ending those
discrepancies since they could ensure that they receive more social spending and veto
on programs that might further impoverish them. Malapportionment could then serve
as an internal development aid mechanism that redistributes the nation’s wealth in favor
of those in need.

Unfortunately, in Argentina and Brazil these overrepresented

subnational units have intensely hierarchical political systems (Samuels and Snyder
2001b). Elites maintain dominance over the poor through clientelistic relations that
leave them dependent on the elite. Paradoxically, it is the richest, most developed areas
where left wing parties like the Argentine FrePaSo and the Brazilian PT perform(ed)
best.
My argument in this chapter has two components. First, I compare the strength
of civil society in Uruguay with that of Argentina and Brazil as well as their
malalapportioned legislatures.

Second, I illustrate how civil society and

malapportionment can push congress into either a venal-parochial direction or a
programmatic one.

The Inclusiveness of Uruguayan Politics
The areas represented in the Uruguayan Congress perform better on a host of
predictors of civil society and widespread political participation (education, equality,
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and human development) than do the areas represented in the Argentine Congress
(though not in Argentina as a whole) and Brazil in general (though the areas the
Brazilian congress represents perform even worse than the whole nation). If civil
society is strong, “economic liberalism is likely to be inclusionary and to lay the
foundations for viable democratic regimes” and if it weak, then economic liberalism is
likely to be exclusionary and democracy will remain fragile (Oxhorn and Ducatezeiler
1999, 37-38). The legislature, should be the branch of inclusiveness—both internally
by representing the entire nation and externally by serving as a coequal of the executive.
In these next two sections, I apply Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler’s theory of civil society
and inclusiveness to the Uruguayan, Argentine, and Brazilian congresses.

In this

section, I explain how inclusiveness and strong civil society involvement lie at the heart
of Uruguayan politics. In the next section, I apply it to the Argentine and Brazilian
congresses since malapportionment distinguishes them from their nations and explain
how malapportionment hinders the development of a politics similar to those of
Uruguay
Uruguayan politics has a long tradition of inclusiveness and relies less on
clientelism and caudillismo. The double simultaneous vote I described earlier was
originally conceived of as a way of giving all political factions a voice in the legislature.
José Batlle y Ordoñez, the most important twentieth century political figure, established
a “collegial” executive like that of Switzerland that lasted from the early 1900s into the
1960s.

This system gave each of Uruguay’s faction strong executive branch

representation by dividing the presidency and giving each faction a piece (as opposed to
the winner take all representation of most presidential regimes). It also prevented the
caudillismo that reigned in Argentina and Brazil (Sondrol 1997, 111). A policy of
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coparticipación, giving significant ministerial appointments to members of each
faction, persisted even after the return of democracy in the 1980s as both Presidents
Sanguinetti and Lacalle appointed ministers from the opposing to party (Blake, 9-11).
This tradition of politics by consensus ran so deep in the middle twentieth
century that Sondrol argues that it became the military’s central criticism of democracy
and impetus for overthrowing the civil government: that democracy meant
“compromise, immobilism, the substitution of political criteria for efficiency, and a
myriad of special-interest legislation, for a rational integrated plan” (1997, 112-113). In
other words, the military found Uruguayan democracy too conciliatory. O’Donnell
cites this tradition of consensus, along with constitutional structures, as the cause for the
Uruguayan’s Congress’s strong, effective opposition to reforms and Uruguayan
presidents’ willingness to compromise instead of ignoring it (1994). The inclusiveness
of Uruguayan politics, which the nation’s strong civil society permits, is thus a reason
why its congress plays such a strong role in policy formulation.

The Exclusiveness of Argentine and Brazilian Politics
Argentine and Brazilian politics have a strongly exclusive character since
members of the executive branch are capable of implementing their desired policy
agendas with little substantive input from the legislative branch as has already been
outlined. The relatively high scores on civil society predictors (for Latin America) are
largely irrelevant to their congresses since areas of low civil society development are
significantly overrepresented.
Could differences of inclusiveness stem from different political traditions as
O’Donnell argues? A long tradition of consensus in Uruguayan congress was certainly
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an important factor in the inclusive economic reform process. To some extent it stems
from Uruguay’s unique history including the resolution of its interfactional civil war
and Jose Batllé y Ordoñez’s example of strong leadership through consensus
(Spektorowski, 2000). On the other hand, Uruguay lacks the strong socioeconomic
inequalities of its neighbors that hinder civil society.
Moreover, Argentine and Brazilian authoritarian elites intentionally used
legislative malapportionment to solidify their rule under a “competitive authoritarian”
regime in which the legislature does not challenge the executive branch. The Brazilian
military regime consciously changed the electoral law to create a maximum number of
deputies per state, a law that only affected São Paulo—one of the states with the highest
HDIs and the center of student and union protests. The regime also created new states
in the peripheral North to further dilute the influence of the metro since that was the
locus of opposition to the exclusionary politics of the regime (Fleischer 1994).
Similarly, Argentine military regimes increased the minimum provincial representation
in the Chamber of Deputies and created new states in the periphery since they believed
that voters in the periphery were more “pragmatic” than those in the metro, where the
center of opposition to the military regime and syndicalism lay. Although Argentina
and Brazil lacked the unique history of inclusive politics of Uruguay, authoritarian
elites consciously increased legislative malapportionment to push politics in a more
exclusive direction.

Without malapportionment, neither country’s politics would

probably have been as inclusive as Uruguay’s, but legislative malapportionment clearly
prevented the high civil society development in the metro from realizing its full
potential in national politics.
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Uruguay thus had an opportunity to forge a politics of inclusion while
authoritarian elites used malapportionment to prevent that opportunity from arising in
Argentina and Brazil. The literature on the elimination of malapportionment in the
Uruguayan Senate is thin (Samuels and Snyder 2004), but it did coincide with the
reform period under President Batllé y Ordoñez, which consciously sought to make
politics more inclusive. This would suggest that the creation of a single, multimember
district as opposed to the previous malapportioned senate was a part of this general
movement toward inclusive politics—possibly meaning that Uruguayan elites
eliminated malapportionment to shift politics in an inclusive direction while Argentine
and Brazilian elites did the opposite.

How Civil Society, Civil Society Predictors, and Venality Interact
This section draws a picture of how low levels of civil society and low scores on
civil society predictors—most notably poverty and low education levels—affect the
inclusivity of politics.

A venal-parochial legislature exchanges its role in policy

formulation for defending narrow constituent interests and bringing pork into the
electoral district. By not influencing policy, the legislature thus leaves the executive
branch to do as it wishes as long as it provides enough pork barrel—thus leaving
economic reform an exclusionary process. Low levels of civil society and civil society
predictors facilitate this exchange in three interconnected ways: they increase the
relative value of clientelism, decrease politicians’ accountability for their policy actions,
and increase the power of provincial party bosses/governors.
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The Relative Value of Clientelism
Venality in Argentina and Brazil revolves around securing federal resources that
can easily be distributed by clientelistic networks instead of the American connotation
of pork barrel spending with transportation spending and farm subsidies.

Public

employment and health care funds are among the most common forms of clientelism
since they can easily be channeled to local party bosses in exchange for obtaining votes
from municipalities.

Calvo and Murillo (2004; 2006) demonstrate that poverty

increases the relative value of clientelism as an electoral strategy by demonstrating that
the Peronist Party has a “built-in” advantage in clientelistic politics over the Radical
Party since its supporters tend to have lower incomes and thus will accept lower income
public jobs. Therefore, the Peronist Party receives more “bang for its buck” than the
Radical Party does. A large portion of the difference between the incomes lies in the
geographic difference between the two parties: while the Radical Party’s support is
mostly limited to the metro, the Peronist party has a strong presence in the periphery. A
similar process could very well have occurred in Brazil, where the most programmatic
party, the PT, was concentrated in the developed metro and an electoral strategy
centered around clientelism would have proven inefficient in comparison with parties in
the poorer North and Northeast.
The lower levels of education in the periphery further increase the relative value
of clientelism. Education provides the cognitive and intellectual skills that reduce the
costs of participation (Downs 1957) and increases the probability that citizens will
possess important political knowledge (Rosenberg 1988). Educated citizens can better
assess their interests and policy preferences.

As opposed to North America and
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Western Europe where the main educational divide lies between those with secondary
and university educations, the 73% of the population over 15 did not graduate from high
school in the Argentine periphery and 73% of the population over 25 did not graduate
from primary school in the Brazilian periphery. Where literacy and basic reading
comprehension are not universal, a basic understanding politics is even less so. A basic
understanding of neoliberal policies and how they affect peoples’ daily lives was
probably absent from society’s large bottom end. The concrete and immediate benefits
of clientelism (jobs, money, health care, housing) thus possessed a natural advantage
over the abstract realm of programmatic politics—especially neoliberal policies such
lowering tariffs, balancing budgets, and currency pegging. The switch from political
inclusion to political exclusion in exchange for clientelism thus becomes easier when
education levels are low—and the Argentine and Brazilian legislatures overrepresent
areas where they are low.

Accountability
Poverty and low levels of education both fuel a lack of accountability for
politicians who support painful, unpopular economic reforms. Poverty helps fuels the
power of clientelism and patronage as described in the section above and, as Fox
argues, clientelism shifts the balance of responsibilities away from politicians to citizens
since politicians expect a certain behavior from citizens (support for their machine) in
exchange for clientelistic favors. In impoverished regions the threat of losing important
government benefits that play a central role in the economy should particularly increase
political subordination.

This creates what Fox calls a “reverse horizontal

accountability” in which it is politicians—not the voters—who can punish (1994, 7).
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Furthermore, civil society underdevelopment deprives the public of a space autonomous
from the state to voice its opposition to economic reforms and hinders the development
of a viable political opposition—which allows the dominant party to fuse itself with the
state and monopolize clientelistic resources.

Thus, politicians from impoverished

districts who support an unpopular neoliberal agenda do not have to worry about their
parties losing support since their constituencies cannot hold them accountable.
Low levels of education also contributed to low levels of accountability in a
similar manner to the relative value of clientelism. Despite the right-wing voting
records of many members of congress from the Brazilian periphery, for example,
politicians almost universally used leftwing, populist rhetoric to win votes (Mainwaring
1992)—indicating that many poorer voters in the periphery prefer leftwing, populist
policies. Politicians who campaign one way and vote another face a problem at the
polls when voters understand the contradiction. Yet politicians with a less educated
constituency do not face this problem: the lack of education hinders voters from
tracking the behavior of their members of congress and punishing them for the “wrong”
vote. If they are illiterate, they cannot read a newspaper to discover how their members
of congress voted—assuming they even understand whether the vote falls in line with
their leftwing preferences. Opposition to pegging the Argentine peso to the dollar
because of its effects on the prices of agricultural exports depended on a basic level of
education that did not exist among a significant portion of the periphery population.
Accountability depends on the ability of voters to understand and track politicians’
behavior—abilities that low educational levels hinder.
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Provincial Party Bosses
The combination of the strong potential of clientelism as an electoral strategy
and low political accountability make these regions prime for the domination by
provincial party bosses that Jones and Hwang (2006) and de Luca, Jones, and Tula
(2002) describe. If a political party controls important provincial executive positions
such as governor or mayor of a large municipality, then it has excellent access to
clientelistic resources and thus can do very well in federal legislative races.

The

pragmatic nature of this system of politics—one in which personal enrichment matters
more than actual policies—means that federal legislators extract as many resources
from the federal government as they can for the provincial party machine. Since some
of the most lucrative votes are also the most unpopular, the lack of accountability is a
true asset to these legislators. The monopolization of political life by provincial party
bosses faces a lesser threat of civil society sponsoring strong political opposition.
The support of politicians for wide-reaching economic reforms in poorly
educated areas with a weak civil society should not surprise us. Legislators from these
areas do not have to face the quandary of voting for an unpopular law in exchange for
pork. They often will not be held accountable for their vote for an unpopular law while
securing resources for clientelism. Thus, the political incentives are stacked in favor of
venality instead of programmatism. Moreover, the lower educational levels in the
periphery further decrease the accountability of politicians since less educated voters
are less likely to formulate strong political opinions and observe their legislators’
actions through activities like reading the newspaper and the Internet.
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Low civil society development as well as poverty and education increase the relative
value of clientelism as an electoral strategy, decrease the accountability of politicians,
and support the political dominance of provincial party bosses. Since Argentina and
Brazil’s peripheries have less civil society and a less educated populace,
malapportionment’s overrepresentation of them thus shifts politics into an exclusionary
direction as long as clientelistic networks remain intact.

Conclusion
Like the hall of mirrors in an amusement park fun house, malapportionment
takes existing features of societies and distorts their size to create fundamentally
different societies. If large geographic disparities on an important measure exist, then
the overrepresentation and underrepresentation of geographic units can make the nation
the congress represents very different from the nation it serves. Scholars have long
described the distinction between the metro and the periphery in South America
(O’Donnell 1994), but have not examined it in relation to civil society development,
much less attempted to measure it (albeit with predictors) as I have.
These measurements indicate that the peripheries of both countries perform
much worse on civil society predictors than do the cores. Although these regional
disparities would have an important effect on politics in correctly apportioned
legislatures, legislatures that overrepresent these areas as much as the Argentine and
Brazilian Senates will tend to reflect the politics of a county that scores worse on civil
society predictors. Since civil society plays an important role in making economic
reform inclusive, the Argentine and Brazilian economic reform processes thus became
more exclusive than they would have been if the legislatures had reflected their nations’
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true civil society levels.

Their overrepresentation makes Argentine and Brazilian

politics more exclusive than one would predict looking at the nation’s performance on
civil society predictors. Moreover, two civil society predictors—poverty and education
levels—have important effects on the inclusivity of economic reforms independent of
civil society. A weak civil society, high levels of poverty, and low levels of education
increased the relative value of clientelism, decreased accountability, and increased the
power of provincial party bosses. Uruguay, on the other hand, lacks regional disparities
in civil society predictors as strong as its two neighbors. Despite the relatively mild
regional disparities that do exist, its legislature’s correct apportionment prevents the
low-scoring areas form dominating legislative politics. Thus malapportionment coupled
with regional disparities in civil society development helps explain the higher number
of parochial-venal legislators in Argentina and Brazil than in Uruguay.

Chapter 5: Low- and Lower-Maintenance Constituencies
In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that the populations of a majority of peripheral
provinces are less educated and well off. Yet there exist important population and
economic disparities within the peripheries that complicate the civil society predictor
argument that served as the basis of the last chapter. The majority of the peripheral
provinces fill the bottom positions in rankings of Argentine provinces by HDI
throughout the 1990s, but five provinces in the periphery (Tierra del Fuego, Santa Cruz,
Neuquen, La Pampa, and Chubut) consistently scored higher than the lowest scoring
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metro province (Santa Fé or Mendoza depending on the year). Although they made up
a relatively small portion of the peripheral and general Argentine population (10% and
3% respectively), they are among the most overrepresented and when combined with
the five provinces in the metro account for 65% of seats in the Chamber of Deputes and
42% of seats in the Senate. Similarly in Brazil, six states have similar development
levels to the Brazilian metropolitan states (albeit generally toward its bottom end).
These states (the Federal District, Matto Grosso, Matto Grosso do Sul, Goiás, Roraima,
and Amapá) hold only 6.8% of the population but elect 22% of senate seats and 11% of
chamber seats.

Could the existence of these states and provinces mitigate the

challenges of low civil society development?

Argentina: The Highly Developed Periphery as the Federal Black Hole
A look at the political behavior of the Argentine provinces during the 1990s
suggests that they only increased the number of venal-parochial legislators. Gibson and
Calvo (2000) argue that Menem’s political coalition for economic reforms depended on
channeling federal resources to the overrepresented periphery, finding that federal
discretionary transfers increased by 30% (mean) for metro provinces and 76% for
peripheral provinces. Isolating the highly developed peripheral provinces from the rest
of the periphery reveals that transfers for these provinces increased by 126%. The
highly developed periphery exceeded the periphery as a whole in fulfilling the first
condition of venal-parochial behavior—legislators demanding resources from the
federal government to their constituencies.

The second condition is exchanging

political support for those resources. Gibson and Calvo use the change in the Peronist
presidential vote between 1989 and 1995 as a measure of how well Menem maintained
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political support for his economic reform agenda. Whereas the mean increase of the
Peronist vote in the metro provinces was 3.3%, the increase in the periphery was 7.6%-making for what Gibon and Calvo call a “strong” connection between increased federal
funds and political support for Menem. Again the highly developed peripheral
provinces acted more venal-parochial than the rest of the periphery with a mean
increase of 9.9% of the Peronist presidential vote.
What explains the failure of the civil society predictor argument to explain the
behavior of these five provinces? These provinces’ congressional delegations share
another important feature: extraordinarily low populations and extreme legislative
overrepresentation.

They make up five of the eight least populated provinces in

Argentina and despite holding 3% of the Argentine population, they elected more than
20% of its senate seats. Whereas the mean Argentine province has a population of 1.3
million and the less developed peripheral provinces have a mean population of 631,000,
these five provinces have a mean population of less than 250,000. These provinces’
status as among the least populated provinces in Argentina also places them among the
most overrepresented in the congress. Overrepresentation can alter the costs of vote
buying so dramatically that a province’s civil society development may not prevent its
congressional delegation from acting venally if the executive branch offers enough
federal resources per capita.
Gibson and Calvo demonstrate that President Menem could cut public
employment drastically by concentrating these reforms in the highly populated but
underrepresented Argentine provinces while leaving overrepresented provinces
relatively untouched since cuts there would not have provided enough in fiscal savings
(there were less absolute jobs) to justify the political capital required (2000). Similarly,
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they demonstrate that these provinces received disproportionate amounts of
discretionary transfers from the federal government in order to attain the support of
their congressional delegations. They name these lightly populated electoral districts
“low-maintenance constituencies,” which provides scholars a new and useful concept
for understanding the relationship between malapportionment and vote buying.
Poverty increases the incentives for legislators to act venal-parochial because
their constituents require fewer funds per capita to satisfy their needs and are also more
dependent on politically controlled resources. The highly developed periphery would
thus be an area where venal-parochial politics would not be effective were it not for its
extremely low population. Whereas voters in the less developed periphery might not
understand painful economic reforms and content themselves with clientelism’s
relatively small benefits, voters in the highly developed periphery would demand
compensation for their legislators’ support for those reforms. We can thus expect that
the highly developed periphery would receive a much larger amount of federal
resources per capita than the periphery—not to speak of an even greater disparity
between it and the socioeconomically similar metro.

Following the Money: Discretionary Transfers and the Highly Developed
Periphery
If the congressional delegations of developed peripheral provinces acted venally
because they were low-maintenance constituencies, we should expect that they received
a disproportionate share of federal resources per capita. The share should be especially
large since the populace of such provinces is well off and thus requires a larger amount
of funds to compensate per person than in poorer provinces. Federal transfers to the
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provinces play a particularly important role in Argentine federalism. First, Argentina
has had a regime of “co-participation” since the 1930s by which the federal government
collects the bulk of all taxes and then redistributes them to provinces through a
constantly changing formula.

Second, the federal government keeps provincial

governments solvent when they go bankrupt through federal transfers.

Third, the

government often sends funds to provincial governments, sometimes for a particular
purpose (education for example) and sometimes not. This latter type is known as
discretionary transfers.All three types of federal transfers have political bases and often
have more to do with winning the votes of a province’s congressional delegation for
national policymaking than provincial concerns.
As Gibson and Calvo demonstrate, the periphery received a great deal more on
average in discretionary transfers than the metro per capita: $1,204 versus $451 in 1995.
Yet if we separate the five highly developed peripheral provinces from the fourteen less
developed peripheral provinces, an even greater disparity emerges: the former received
$1,884 per capita while the latter only received $931. If we remove Menem’s home
province of La Rioja—which received the third most federal funds per capita most
likely because of paybacks to political allies—the less developed periphery only
received $814 per capita. The two provinces that received the most per capita are
among the five developed peripheral provinces (Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz). In
fact, the amount of money that the less developed periphery receives per capita is closer
to the metro than to the highly periphery. It appears that the highly developed periphery
is actually the section of the country that receives a truly disproportionate share of
federal resources and is responsible for pushing the mean amount of federal funds that
peripheral provinces received to $1,204 per capita.
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The power of these highly developed, low-maintenance constituencies becomes
even more clear when we look at the changes in the distribution of gross discretionary
funds between 1989 and 1995. President Menem faced a spectacular challenge in 1990.
Despite winning the presidency in a landslide, his mandate was for a return to Peronist
populism—not the neoliberal reforms that he came to believe Argentina’s economic
situation necessitated once he took office. If he attempted to establish a coalitionalworkable relationship with the congress, the extent of his economic reforms would have
been too limited for him to receive more loans from international financial institutions.
Instead, he established a venal-parochial relationship with certain legislators by
increasing the overall amounts of federal funds that went directly to provinces and
guided it using the logic of low-maintenance constituencies. Menem thus channeled
even more discretionary funds to the highly developed periphery to buy its votes.
Between 1989, the year Menem took office, and his reelection in 1995, the developed
periphery went from receiving $203 million total in discretionary funds to $478 million.
Even more interesting, however, is how the direction federal aid shifted during
that period. The developed periphery increased its share of total discretionary funds
from 14.5% to 26%—a substantial sum for provinces that only hold 3% of the
population.7 Contrary to what we might assume, however, the metro received a 38%
increase in discretionary funds to $492 million and it received 26% of the total—a 1%
increase from 1989.8 Surprisingly it is the less developed periphery, provinces that
Gibson and Calvo include among their low-maintenance constituencies, that only
received 3% more in discretionary funds in 1995 than in 1989 and actually saw its share
7

These calculations exclude Governor Menem’s home province of La Rioja (a less developed periphery
province). La Rioja saw its share of discretionary transfers increase by 404%, but it is more likely that
Menem was providing those funds to reward allies from his time as governor than attempting to win over
a congressional delegation to which he was probably close.
8
This figure excludes the Federal Capital, for which there is no data.
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of discretionary funds fall from 60% to 47%. Menem clearly used low-maintenance
constituencies in order to win legislative support for his ambitious economic reforms,
but they were mostly limited to the highly developed periphery
This raises the question of why Menem could decrease the portion of the federal
budget that the less developed periphery received but still enjoy political support there.
Legislators whose districts contain widespread poverty, a less educated public, and low
civil society development are unlikely to face serious electoral threats if they support
unpopular economic reforms for reasons described in the last chapter. Additionally,
highly developed peripheral provinces were less dependent on the federal government
for their budget than the less developed periphery. Whereas 72.5% of the budget for
developed peripheral provinces came from federal government transfers in 1995, 80.5%
of the budgets of the less developed peripheral provinces—provinces that generally
receive less federal funds per capita—came from federal funds. This gives legislators
from the highly developed periphery more freedom in negotiating with the federal
government since they could more easily accept a decline in federal funds than
legislators from the poorer provinces.
The results of dividing the periphery into a highly developed section and a less
developed section means a significant revision of Gibson and Calvo’s characterization
of the role of low-maintenance constituencies in Argentina. When President Menem
faced the challenge of enacting a neoliberal agenda despite campaigning as a populist,
he channeled an extremely disproportionate amount of federal funds to highly
developed low-maintenance constituencies to win the support of their powerful
congressional delegations. If he did not provide a large enough amount of per capita
federal resources to those provinces in order to offset the pain of deep economic
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reforms, then the legislators’ educated, well off constituents could have rebelled.
Luckily for Menem, the most developed provinces were also among the most lowmaintenance constituencies and could provide enough per capita federal funds to win
the support of their legislators without spending the billions that a similar strategy in the
metro would have cost.

On the other hand, the less developed provinces in the

periphery only saw a slight increase in the amount of federal funds they received.
Despite being low-maintenance constituencies, Menem did not see a need to funnel
more resources to them as he did with highly developed periphery. This is probably a
result of the lack of accountability described in the last chapter because of poverty, low
levels of education, and low levels of civil society development.
Low-maintenance constituencies thus played a critical role in increasing the
number of legislators who acted in a venal-parochial mode.

Whereas a simple

application of Gibson and Calvo’s thesis that low-maintenance constituencies tended to
be poor would have resulted in only reinforcing venal-parochial behavior, that Menem
funneled resources to low-maintenance constituencies with rich, educated populations
meant that he shifted congressional delegations from acting in a workable capacity to a
venal-parochial one. Malapportionment placed the congressional delegations of five
highly developed peripheral provinces, provinces that held 21% of seats in the Senate
and 10% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, into venal-parochial mode through the
incentives of low-maintenance constituencies.

Brazil: A Weaker Low-Maintenance Constituency Logic
Scholars have yet to apply the concept of low-maintenance constituencies to
Brazil. Federal transfers to provinces in Brazil take the form of revenue sharing, which
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does not change often and are generally apolitical, and voluntary transfers for social
programs and pork, which are generally very political (Lima 2001). An analysis very
similar to the one I did of Argentina using data from IBGE and the Institute of Applied
Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada) reveals that the highly
developed periphery’s role as a bastion of low-maintenance constituencies is very
mixed as opposed to the clear role of the Argentine.
Although the simple average of the highly developed peripheral states’ receipts
suggests that they receive a good deal more than the less developed periphery per capita
($33,000 as opposed to $27,000), the elimination of Roraima, a clear outlier, brings that
average down to only $21,000. Roraima, the least populated state, did extremely well
in per capita transfers, receiving $88,000 per citizen in 1998—an extraordinary sum
compared to the $11,000 for the average metro state and $27,000 for the average
peripheral state. The Federal District also did well, receiving $40,000. The three other
highly developed states from the Center-West region, however, received between
$19,000 to 22,000—roughly halfway between the metro and peripheral state averages.
Table 5.1: Federal Voluntary
Transfers to Regions in 1998

Region
North
Northeast
South
Southeast
Center-West
Metro
Periph
Highly Developed
Periph
Highly Developed

Average Federal
Voluntary
Transfers Per
Capita in millions of
1998 US $
34
23
8
10
28
11
27
33
21
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Periph
without Roraima
Less Developed
24
Periph
Source: IPEA and IBGE, 1998

Particularly strange given the logic of low-maintenance constituencies is that
only $23,000 went to Amapá, the second least populated state and thus an extremely
cheap source of votes for the executive. The political situation in 1998 may explain
Amapá’s small amount. Lima (2001) finds that two variables explain the amount of per
capita resources that a state received: unsurprisingly smaller populations meant larger
amounts and the governor belonging to a party in President Cardoso’s governing
coalition also meant larger amounts. Amapá’s governor at the time was not, which
could explain why it did not receive an amount per capita more similar to Roraima. On
the other hand, the congressional delegations of the Argentine highly developed
periphery displayed a remarkable political pragmatism, almost always serving in the
Argentine president’s political coalition and receiving compensation for it. Analysis of
data from times when the governor of Amapá and the President did not have different
political bases could be very revealing (I could not find such data).
In sum, the highly developed periphery as the source of lower-maintenance
constituencies seems to have been much less of a factor in Brazil than Argentina. A
good portion of this may result from three differences in Argentina and Brazil. First,
the highly developed periphery did not dominate the bottom rung of Brazilian
population rankings to the extent it did in Argentina: of the twenty seven Brazilian
states, the highly developed peripheral states occupied the twelfth, twenty through
twenty second, and twenty sixth through twenty seventh places as opposed to holding
five of the eight least populated provinces in Argentina. Second, Brazil is across the
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board less developed than Argentina with more poverty and less education everywhere,
meaning that all politicians are more likely to represent constituencies that would be
naturally reactive to clientelism.

The citizens of the Brazilian highly developed

periphery would therefore not demand thirty three times their fair share of voluntary
transfers in exchange for their politicians supporting neoliberal reforms as the Argentine
highly developed periphery.

Third, governors have less control over their states’

congressional delegations than do Argentine governors because of the open ballot
electoral system (Mainwaring 1991, 26-28; Ames 2002, 65-74). Ames demonstrates
that Brazilian political candidates tend to focus their campaign efforts on certain
municipalities and deliver resources them instead of using state wide political machines.
Discretionary transfers therefore may be targeted to municipalities instead of to states.
On the other hand, there is a clear bias in favor of the periphery in general at the
expense of the metropolitan provinces in terms of the per capita amount of federal
resources. The peripheral states’ low populations make most of them low-maintenance
constituencies in relation to the metro states and helps explain the amount of federal
resources that they receive. The demographics of most peripheral states suggest that
they would act venal-parochially without such high amounts of federal resources per
capita, thus low-maintenance constituencies reinforce that behavior instead of cause it
as happened in the Argentine highly developed periphery.

Uruguay: The Senate as a Check against Venality
The presence of low-maintenance constituencies in Argentina allowed Menem
to overcome the challenge posed by highly developed provinces and further reinforced
the venal nature of the Brazilian Congress. The low level of malapportionment in the
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Uruguayan Chamber of Representatives and the complete lack thereof in the Senate
thus prevented presidents from targeting federal resources in as efficient a manner as
was done in Argentina.
The Uruguayan Chamber of Representatives, like any legislature in which seats
are distributed to subnational units, is not perfectly apportioned. Like Argentina and
Brazil and unlike the United States, Uruguay does not automatically shift seats after
censuses to track demographic shifts. Thus the Uruguayan Chamber of Representatives
is subject to what Samuels and Snyder term “natural malapportionment” (2004). On the
other hand, Uruguay has one of the lowest birth rates in Latin America as well as
relatively little internal migration, thus the country has not faced the same major natural
malapportionment as Brazil where the migration from the North and Northeast to the
favelas

in

the

Southeast

significantly

raised

that

congress’s

degree

of

malapportionment.
The degree of malapportionment affects the viability of a president’s lowmaintenance constituency strategy for winning legislative support since the greater the
discrepancies between population and voting power, the more efficient channeling a
disproportionate amount of resources into a select few district is.

The greatest

difference in representation in Uruguay is that a vote in the department of Flores
receives 3.9 as much representation in the Chamber of Deputies as a vote in the
department of San Jose. The greatest difference in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies,
however, is almost 13 times and 21 times in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies.
Uruguayan executives could not target the distribution of national resources to certain
subnational units to gain a gigantic amount of votes as efficiently as executives in
Argentina and Brazil.
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The Uruguayan Senate is the ultimate bulwark against a narrowly local, venal
approach to politics. The single, national multimember district from which senators are
elected represents perfect apportionment. This makes the Uruguayan Senate the polar
opposite of the Argentine and Brazilian senates, whose malapportionment dwarrfs the
considerable malapportionment in the lower houses described above since a vote in a
province like Tierra del Fuego is worth hundreds more than a vote in the Province of
Buenos Aires.
Even more importantly, senators all represent the same high-maintenance
constituency: the nation.

The Chamber of Representatives, which is slightly

malapportioned, has twenty different electoral districts and the president can still win
votes for legislative initiatives by directing national resources to the districts of
legislators willing to exchange their vote. Uruguayan senators should be much less
likely to engage in venal-parochial behavior since they have no single electoral district
for which to act venally. Ames demonstrates that candidates in Brazil’s multimember
districts focus their campaign efforts on particular neighborhoods and municipalities
and delivers clientelistic goods to them (2002b).

Such a strategy, however, is

impossible with the Uruguayan double simultaneous vote system since voters could
only choose a president, a slate of senate candidates, and then a slate of representative
candidates.

An important area for future research is to what degree sublemas

concentrate their campaign efforts on certain regions of the country and deliver national
resources to those regions. Nevertheless, the Uruguayan Congress is probably a body
that would very rarely approve a reform program that required a good deal of sacrifice
for the majority of the population while leaving a geographic minority untouched as in
Argentina.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This study sought to provide an explanation to a puzzle: why did the Argentine
and Brazilian Congresses act as collectors of pork instead of formulators of policy in the
neoliberal era while the Uruguayan Congress aggressively challenged the executive.
Malapportionment is an intriguing explanation since the Argentine/Brazilian
Congresses are the most extremely malapportioned in the world while the Uruguayan
Congress is very proportional. The question of who these legislatures represent is a
fundamental and overlooked question. If citizens of a certain race, gender, or economic
status had their votes count up to one hundred times more than other citizens in
legislatures, scholars would easily connect that to legislative outcomes and behavior.
The case should be no different with geography when the types of populations
overrepresented is not random and with important socioeconomic patterns.
The major difference between the Argentine/Brazilian Congresses and the
Uruguayan Congress was that the former acted in what Cox and Morgenstern call a
“venal-parochial” mode and the latter acted in a “workable” mode. I also argued that
analysts should not think of congresses as monoliths when we assign them modes, but
rather as holding differently sized groups of legislators behaving a certain way.
Malapportionment can thus provide an explanation for different types of legislative
behaviors if legislators from an underrepresented part tend toward one type of behavior
and legislators from an overrepresented part tend toward another.
Scholars have referred, in passing, to the Argentine and Brazilian peripheral
provinces’ lagging behind metropolitan provinces’s development levels. Using census
and UNDP data, I compared peripheral and metropolitan states/provinces in their HDI
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scores, education levels, and poverty/inequality.

I found that they all differed

significantly except for Brazilian inequality, in which the metropolitan and peripheral
provinces are quite close. I also found the existence of a handful of states/provinces
that make up a highly developed periphery that is comparable to the metropolitan
provinces in its performance on these measures. I compared the nations the legislatures
govern and the nations they represent, finding a critical importance between the two: the
legislatures represent much less developed nations than the ones they governed. A
correctly apportioned Argentine legislature would have resembled the Uruguayan in
development levels, but the actual did not because of malapportionment. Both Brazilian
legislatures fall behind the Uruguayan, though the actual legislature much more than the
correctly apportioned one.
Next, I examined how the overrepresentation of the less developed and highly
developed peripheries affected the behavior of the Argentine and Brazilian congresses.
I found that poor performance on civil society predictors meant a politics that revolved
around clientelism, with little accountability, and strong party bosses. This combination
made economic reform an exclusionary process in Argentina and Brazil. On the other
hand, Uruguay’s tradition of a politics of participation without vast swaths living in
poverty helped make reform an inclusionary process.
The highly developed periphery is a new concept to students of South American
political geography. In Argentina and Brazil, it could serve as a bulwark against the
influence of the less developed periphery’s brand of exclusionary politics. However,
the concept of low-maintenance constituencies developed by Gibson and Calvo explains
why they did not.

Simply put, they serve as a “greater bang for your buck” in

distributing federal resources since a small amount of absolute federal resources can
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work out to a large amount per capita in lightly populated states. In such cases,
congressional delegations that would normally operate in a programmatic way can be
convinced to operate in a venal-parochial way if offered enough.

Applying this

distinction to Argentina, I find that the large increase in federal funds that went to the
periphery in the 1990s mostly went to the highly developed periphery while the share
that went to the less developed periphery actually decreased.

This is most likely

because the less educated population in the less developed periphery is less vocal about
its needs while the more educated, politically involved highly developed population
would only have allowed their legislators to approve reforms if they received
compensation. The image that emerges from Brazil is less clear, but low-maintenance
constituencies certainly reinforced the venal-parochial orientation of the less developed
periphery. Uruguay, on the other hand, lacks very low-maintenance constituencies and
its senate is elected on a national basis and thus does not have the local, particularistic
incentives that the two other senates have.

Malapportionment and Democratization
Of the challenges that confront Latin American democracies, weak legislatures
rank high on the list. O’Donnell argues that students of democracy need to separate
democratic transitions into two stages: the transition from authoritarian rule to a
democratically elected government and the other “from a democratically-elected
government to a democratic regime or, equivalently, to an institutionalized,
consolidated democracy.” A country makes the second transition based on its “success
or failure in the building of a set of institutions which become important decisional
points in the flow of political power” (1994, 1-2). Countries that struggle with the
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second transition, “delegative democracies” as O’Donnell calls them, often have a
president who governs without the constraints of an independent congress or judiciary.
The political process behind economic reform in 1990s exhibited the delegative nature
of Argentine and Brazilian democracy since the congresses of both countries gave the
president a “blank check” in economic policy as long as he provided adequate resources
to their clientelistic networks.
Did malapportionment assist or impede in Argentina and Brazil’s second
transition?

Samuels and Snyder conjecture that malapportionment may actually

“contribute to a process whereby democracy is simultaneously strengthened at the
center and undermined in the periphery” since anti-democratic elites in the periphery
have less to fear from a democratic transition and will consent to it because they will
retain enough legislative power to prevent the federal government from challenging
their authority (2001b). By breaking down democratic transitions into O’Donnell’s two
parts, however, the result appears mixed. Though malapportionment may strengthen
democracy by allowing the first transition to occur, this study’s results indicate that it
prolongs the period spent as a delegative democracy by strengthening the executive
branch in two ways: first malapportionment gives an increased voice to less developed
parts of the country and second, it vastly reduces the costs of vote buying.

Democratization Debates Brought Down to the Subnational Level
Political scientists beginning with Seymour Martin Lipset have pondered the
relationship between economic development and democracy (1959). This relationship
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or lack thereof continues to intrigue political scientists and cause debate over articles
like “Modernization: Theories and Facts” by Przeworski and Limongi (1997). It has
also led to a debate on “sequencing”—whether democracy should precede or follow
economic development or improved governance (Zakaria 2003; Fukuyama 2007;
Mansfield and Snyder 2007). The war in Iraq and neoconservatism have also placed
front and center the question of what developed democracies can do to promote
democratization (Carothers 2007).

Grappling with the world’s cavernous political,

economic, and social disparities unifies these debates over democracy. Can the same
system of government work equally effectively in Indonesia as in Iceland?
Yet these debates have often ignored the equally important question of whether
the same system of government can work as well in modern, cosmopolitan Jakarta as
Indonesia’s most remote, underdeveloped island. Subnational disparities can be every
bit as real and insurmountable as international ones. To better understand international
patterns, scholars must also study intranational patterns.

Do Lipset’s correlations

between development and democracy, and Pzreworski and Limongi’s minimum GDP
per capita levels for sustainable democracy also apply to subnational regions? National
data can hide important creeping variables that appear on the subnational level:
Przeworski and Limongi counted two of Argentina’s democratic breakdowns as outliers
of their theory that increased GDP per capita reduces the chance of democratic
breakdown. Could the low GDP per capita levels in the periphery explain Argentina’s
outlier status during the mid twentieth century and could these subnational disparities
still detract from Argentina’s democratic governance? Unfortunately, Purchasing Parity
Power GDPs, the measure of income Pzreworski and Limongi use to predict the success
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of a democratic regime, are not available at the subnational level so we cannot compare
on “which side of the line” different subnational units in Argentina and Brazil fall.
Similarly, if we accept Mansfield, Snyder, and Zakaria’s advice that autocrats
should “sequence” the introduction of democracy after other goals have been met, then
how should we look on countries with large geographic disparities in economic
development and successful governance? Should nations introduce democracy on the
subnational level where criteria have been met and wait for all regions to meet criteria
before the introduction of democracy on the national level? Or does a majority living
with successfully met criteria suffice?

Scholars generally believe that exogenous

democratization imposed by a foreign power is less likely to survive than endogenous
democratization springing from a people’s organic desire for self-government. But do
we consider democracy imposed on the periphery by the metropolis exogenous or
endogenous?

The Argentine and Brazilian cores served as the center of the

democratization movements during the 1970s and 1980s.

Would their forced

democratization of Paraguay have been any less successful than their democratization
of Northwest Argentina and North Brazil?
Legislative malapportionment in Argentina and Brazil elevates subnational
development disparities to among their greatest challenges in democratic consolidation.
Whereas only a minority in both countries reside in less developed areas, those
minorities hold majorities in the Argentine and Brazilian Congresses and thus hold
vetoes on national policymaking.

Subnational Disparities and Malapportionment as Challenges for Democratization
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Of developing nations, Argentina and Brazil are among the most geographically
unequal in their development. Portions of both countries resemble the Czech Republic
while others resemble Palestine. Cities like Córdoba, Argentina and Florianopolis,
Brazil boast highly educated populations in which university education is normal and
gut-wrenching poverty is not; the populations of Northwest Argentina and North Brazil,
on the other hand, lack access to potable water. This disparity results in the legislatures
of both countries behaving like the legislatures of less developed countries because the
less developed areas enjoy an advantage in representation. Moreover, even legislators
representing districts with strong civil societies, relative economic equality, and
educated constituents confront a different incentive structure than they would in a
correctly apportioned chamber. To act on a programmatic basis in a congress where the
majority acts on a venal/parochial one is to deliver speeches that convince nobody, to
negotiate using a currency (policy) that nobody else uses, and to ensure that one’s
constituents simply pay money into the federal government for the benefit of other
legislators’ constituents. In such a situation, the focus of the Congress shifts even more
thoroughly and solidly in the venal-parochial direction.
Federalism further increases the ability of subnational disparities to challenge
democracy. A developed majority similar to Argentina and Brazil could prevent the
less developed minority from electing governments single handedly.

Yet if less

developed populations govern their own territory, they can elect subnational politicians
that wield substantial power and whose political base is clientelism and patronage
instead of policy. They can more easily develop their own particular political cultures
this way, insulated from the developed majority. Governors serving as provincial party
bosses can use state and federal resources to buy votes for their machines to elect
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federal representatives. An interesting topic for future study would be a comparison
between a federal country and a unitary country, both with significant subnational
disparities.
Uruguay lacks such strong subnational inequalities as well as federalism; despite
some regional variations, it is a completely middle-income country.

Moreover, it

possesses a uniquely democratic, participatory culture for South America. Leaving
aside malapportionment, both of these help explain its strong, independent congress.
Yet it is less clear that this democratic culture could have successfully taken root in a
malapportioned

congress.

Argentina’s

highly

developed

low-maintenance

constituencies demonstrate that no matter how developed, educated, and wealthy a
district, its legislators can act in a venal-parochial manner if it wields enough
disproportionate voting power.

Furthermore, clientelistic machines could have

developed in rural portions of the country if politically controlled resources had become
more important to the local economies of low-maintenance constituencies. Uruguay did
not develop an open, democratic culture because it lacked malapportionment—unique
historic variables like the factional civil war of the 19th century and the leadership of
President Batlle y Ordóñez bear that distinction. On the other hand, the question is not
if a legislature is venal-parochial or workable but how large the sizes of the various
factions were. The low-maintenance constituency logic and the overrepresentation of
some less developed areas would certainly have increased the size of the legislature’s
venal-parochial faction. In that case, malapportionment would have proven an obstacle
to the development of a policy-focused congress. Similarly, the Paraguayan legislature
is well apportioned, but that country was more of a dictatorship than a delegative
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democracy in the 1990s. Malapportionment is an obstacle to the second consolidation,
the absence of which does not mean that other obstacles do not exist.

Aiding the Select Rich
Malapportionment has real consequences for the distribution of federal
resources: the more representation a district receives, the more resources it will receive.
If one accepts that the periphery—the most concentrated pocket of poverty in Argentina
and Brazil—receive more federal resources, this is hardly objectionable. In this light,
malapportionment could theoretically function as an automatic wealth redistribution
mechanism. Stepan finds that federal systems are less likely to have extensive welfare
states because of the increased number of veto points (2004), but the increased
representation of poor areas could serve as a check on this tendency. However, this
study has revealed two important caveats to this potentially beneficial result of
malapportionment.
First, malapportionment does not particularly benefit the less developed
Argentine provinces. Although they certainly receive more funds per capita than the
metropolitan provinces, they still receive a good deal less than the resource rich
peripheral provinces in the south. Some of the least developed provinces have medium
sized populations and thus receive extremely low amounts of federal funds per capita
that prevent their development. The development rationale for the disproportional flow
of federal funds from the metro to the periphery does not apply in Argentina.
Second, politically controlled federal funds rarely find their way to the people
who most need them. Instead, federal funds’ distribution tends to reflect disparities of
political power, with the majority going to those who have it. These funds go to the
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political machines that dominate peripheral provinces and use their access to federal
money for health care and government jobs to keep winning elections in order to keep
on receiving funds. Rather than thinking of a disproportionate amount of funds going to
peripheral provinces, it would be more accurate to conceptualize them as going to
provincial party machines in the periphery. The money that goes into provincial party
machines is money that cannot go to more carefully designed social programs that could
reduce poverty in the periphery instead of benefit party machines. Moreover, there
exists very real poverty in the metropolitan provinces/states of both Argentina and
Brazil and this maldistribution of federal resources prevents the emergence of social
policy to alleviate it.

This study has avoided the major normative questions that the overrepresentation of
some populations based on territory presents. Some criticize any violation of the “one
person, one vote” principle as a violation of democracy itself. Dahl, for example, sees
the considerable overrepresentation of some states in the U.S. Senate as one of the three
remaining undemocratic features of the U.S. Constitution (Dahl 2004).9 On the other
hand, Gibson, Calvo, and Falleti have defended representation based on territory in
Latin America—the cause of massive senatorial malapportionment. (2004). This study
has nothing new to add to the debate over whether malapportionment in principle
violates representative government.

9

Paradoxically, if one person, one vote is a requirement for a democracy, peripheral legislators’ venalparochial orientation may harm Argentine and Brazilian democracy less than a programmatic orientation
would: at the very least their loyalty to the president is loyalty to a politician who wins the national
popular vote. From this perspective, if the 50% of senators who represented 12% of the Argentine and
16% of the Brazilian population had actually opposed the economic reforms out of policy concerns, it
may have been less democratically legitimate than their acquiescence to the executive.
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Yet this study shows that malapportionment had real effects on democratic
governance in Argentina and Brazil during the 1990s. Even if representation based on
territory has a liberal democratic justification, the delegative democracy that it supports
does not.

As for what policies governments can enact in order to combat

malapportionment’s corrosive effects on liberal democracy, they have two avenues—
both obvious and difficult.
The first is a reform of legislative apportionment in both countries to more
accurately reflect their actual population distributions. This would bring the countries
that the legislatures represent and govern into closer unity by making the former much
more developed. The principle of territorial representation that Gibson, Calvo, and
Falletti defend would not necessarily have to disappear: the German Bundesrat gives
the less populated Länder a disproportionately large voice but does not give them all the
same strength regardless of population.

Such a solution, however, would be

exceedingly difficult to pass because amendments must go through the senates of both
countries—exactly where less populated provinces wield the most power and can vote
to retain their power. Barring significant constitutional crises, coups, or a delegative
democrat with overwhelming popularity and power (one to whom Hugo Chávez would
pale in comparison), this reform will probably never come to pass.
The other solution could occur, but is exceedingly difficult. The Argentine and
Brazilian populations have become wealthier and more educated by migrating from the
periphery to the metro.

Yet by leaving the peripheral provinces behind but not

changing the number of legislative seats they receive, their political cultures and power
have not much changed since the middle of the twentieth century. A concentrated effort
to increase the wealth and education of the general populations of the Argentine and
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Brazilian peripheries could help them leave the politics of patronage and pork for a
more programmatic form of politics as citizens come to demand representation instead
of paltry amounts of politically controlled resources. This approach, however, has two
central weaknesses. First, it cannot end the venal-parochial orientation of the Argentine
highly developed periphery’s congressional delegation. As long as a vote in Tierra del
Fuego is worth hundreds of times a vote in Buenos Aires, then presidents will always be
able to buy their votes for a relatively small amount of money to enact unpopular
agendas. Increases in development in some cases would only increase the size of the
highly developed periphery. Second, and more importantly, significant increases in
wealth and education of parts of nations that have relatively few natural resources is a
task easier said than done.
Argentine and Brazilian democracy have faced almost uncountable obstacles:
imperialism, caudillos, military juntas, widespread poverty, hyperinflation, and serf-like
status for some citizens. Malapportionment is itself not one of these. The world’s
oldest continuous democracy, the United States, has a Senate that plays a strong role in
policy formulation—albeit with its share of pork-focused members—despite being the
third most malapportioned upper house in the world. Through historical accident and
clever design by anti-democrats, however, malapportionment reinforces Argentine and
Brazilian

democracy’s

challenges

as

this

study

has

demonstrated.

Such

disproportionate election systems are bound to have some effect on congress and,
unfortunately, it is a negative one. Legislative malapportionment is a tool often used in
pacts during democratic transitions in order to alleviate the concerns of opponents to
democratization (Samuels and Snyder 2001b). Pro-democratic forces should look to the
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Argentine and Brazilian cases as a warning before they agree to giving some an unequal
voice—for it may permanently turn the legislature into an unequal branch.

104

Acknowledgements
Any acknowledgements section would have to begin with Professor Paul Dosh, my
advisor. Not only did he kindly offer to advise my project during his sabbatical, but he
inspired my very interest in Latin American democracy as well. I am positive that if Paul
had taught agricultural science with his contagious energy and enthusiasm, this study
would have been a comparison of different corn growing techniques.
I would also like to thank the faculty whose courses have shaped my thinking on political
institutions: Professor Michael Zis, Professor Julie Dolan, Professor Cecilia Straw,
Professor Jorge Arias, and Professor J.D. Bowen. I owe more to them than to the
bibliography listed next. Stanley Cardinet, José Cazares, and Michael Golston taught me
the invaluable skills of critical thinking and writing in high school. Any work I write
bears their imprint, this one included. Thanks to my fellow Honors Colloquium students
for their Wednesday night camaraderie and to the equal parts hard charging and
supportive Professor Adrienne “Kick Butt” Christiansen. Finally, a big thanks to my
parents. Their love and support allowed me to pursue a practical education in which I
could study the vital topic of Uruguayan democracy.

105

Bibliography
Altman, David and Daniel Chasquetti. 2005. “Re-Election and Political Career Paths in the
Uruguayan Congress, 1985 – 99.” The Journal of Legislative Studies.11 (2): 235–253
Ames, Barry. 1995. "Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting
in the Brazilian Congress." The Journal of Politics. 57 (2): 324-43
Ames, Barry. 2002a. "Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies." In Legislative Politics in
Latin America, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. New York: Cambridge
University Press
Ames, Barry. 2002b. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Anheier, Helmut K. 1998. Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy. London:, UK:
Earthscan Publications.
Bambaci, Juliana, Tamara Saront, and Mariano Tommasi. “The Political Economy of Economic
Reforms in Argentina.” Journal of Economic Policy Reform. 5 (2): 75-88.
Bartkowski, Jerzy and Aleksandra Kasínska-Kania. 2004. “Voluntary Organizations and the
Development of Civil Society.” In European Values at the Turn of the Century, ed.
Wilehlmus Antonius Arts and Loek Halman. Leiden: Brill.
Blake, Charles H. 1998. "Economic Reform and Democratization in Argentina and Uruguay:
The Tortoise and the Hare Revisited?" Journal of Interamerican Studies and World
Affairs 40 (3): 1-26.
Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. ""Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the
Argentine Electoral Market"." American Journal of Political Science. 48 (4): 742-757.
Calvo, Ernesto and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2006. "A New Law of Argentine Politics." In
Argentine Democracy, eds. Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo. University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Calvo, Ernesto, Mariela Szwarcberg, Juan Pablo Micozzi y Juan Facundo Labanca, 2001. “Las
Fuentes Institucionales del Gobierno Dividido en la Argentina: Sesgo Mayoritario, Sesgo
Partidario y Competencia Electoral en las Legislaturas Provinciales Argentinas.” In
Federalismo Electoral Argentino. Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 53-98.
Carothers, Thomas. 2007. “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy. Journal of Democracy. 18 (1), 12-27.
Cason, Jeffrey. 2000. “Electoral Reform and Stability in Uruguay.” Journal of Democracy. 11
(2); 85-98.

106

Cox, Gary, and Scott Morgenstern. 2002. "Epilogue: Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and
Proactive Presidents." In Legislative Politics in Latin America, ed. Scott Morgenstern and
Benito Nacif. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dahl, Robert. 2003. How Democratic is the American Constitution? New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
De Luca, Miguel, Mark P. Jones, and Maria Inks Tula. 2002. "Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes?
Candidate Nomination in Argentina." Comparative Political Studies 35: 413436.
Desposato, Scott W. 2006. “Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in
Brazil's Chamber of Deputies.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (1): 62–80.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Eaton, Kenneth. 2006. " Politicians and Economic Reform in New Democracies." In Argentine
Democracy, ed. Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo. University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press.
Fleischer, David. 1994. Manipulaçoes Casuísticas do Sistema Eleitoral Durante o Período
Militar, ou Como Usualmente o Fetiço Voltova contra o Feitiçero. Cadernos de Ciência
Política 10. Brasília: Universidade da Brasília, Depto. de Ciência Políticas e Relações
Internacionais.
Fox, Jonathan A. 1994. "The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from
Mexico." Center for Global, International and Regional Studies. Reprint Series. Paper
CGIRS-Reprint-2005-5.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1999. “Social Capital and Civil Society.” Prepared for delivery at the IMF
Conference on Second Generation Reforms, George Mason University. October 1st.
Fukuyama, Francis. 2007. “Liberalism versus State-Building.” Journal of Democracy. 18 (3)
Gibson, Edward and Ernesto Calvo. 1997. “Electoral Coalitions and Market Reforms: Evidence
from Argentina.” Paper presented at XX International Congress, Latin American Studies
Association, Guadalajara, Mexico. April 17-19.
Gibson, Edward and Ernesto Calvo. 2000. "Federalism and Low-Maintenance Constituencies:
Territorial Dimensions of Economic Reform." Studies in Comparative International
Development 35 (3): 32-55.
Gibson, David, Ernesto Calvo, and Tulia Falleti. 2004. "Reallocative Federalism: Legislative
Overrepresentation and Public Spending in the Western Hemisphere." In Federalism and
Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward Gibson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Gudgin, Graham and Peter J. Taylor. 1979. Seats, Votes, and the Spatial Organisation of
Elections. London: Pion.
107

Gutierrez, Alfredo and Carlos Quiro. 2000. “Después de negociar, el Gobierno logró la
reforma.” El Clarín. April 27.
Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic
Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hunter, Wendy. 2003. “Brazil’s New Direction.” Journal of Democracy. 14 (2), 151-161.
Hwang, Wonjael, and Mark P. Jones. 2006. "Provincial Party Bosses: Keystone of the Argentine
Congress." In Argentine Democracy, ed. Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Jones, Mark P. 2002. "Explaining the High Level of Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress."
In Legislative Politics in Latin America, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Jones, Mark P., Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. "Amateur
Legislators -- Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral
Rules in a Federal System." American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 656-69
Kay, Steven J. 1999. “Unexpected Privatizations in the Southern Cone.” Comparative Politics.
31 (4), 403-422.
Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine
Peronism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lima, Edilberto Carlos Pontes. 2001. “Transfers from Federal Government to States and
Municipalities in Brazil.” Institute of Brazilian Issues, The Minerva Group.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy.” The American Political Science Review, 53 (1),
69-105.
Llanos, Mariana and Francisco Sánchez. 2006. “Council of Elders? The Senate and its Member
in the Southern Cone.” Latin American Research Review. 41(1): 133-152.
Mainwaring, Scott. 1991. “Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative
Perspective.” Comparative Politics 24 (1): 21-43.
Mezey, Michael. 1979. Comparative Legislatures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott. 1992. “Brazilian Party Underdevelopment in Comparative Perspective.”
Political Science Quarterly. 107 (4): 677-707.
Mainwaring, Scott and David Samuels. 2004. "Strong Federalism, Constraints on the Central
Government, and Economic Reform in Brazil." In Federalism and Democracy in Latin
America, ed. Edward Gibson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
108

Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2007. “The Sequencing ‘Fallacy.’ Journal of
Democracy. 18 (3)
Morgenstern, Scott. 2002. "Explaining Legislative Politics in Latin America." In Legislative
Politics in Latin America, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Morgenstern, Scott. 2004. Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll Call Voting in Latin America and
the United States. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1993. "On the State, Democratization, and some Conceptual Problems: A
Latin American View with Glances at some Post-Communist Countries." World
Development 21 (8). 1355-69.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1994. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5.1: 55-69.
O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1996. “Another Institutionalization: Latin America and Elsewhere,”
Journal of Democracy 7, 2: 34-51.
Oxhorn, Philip and Graciela Ducatenzeiler. 1999. “The Problematic Relationship Between
Economic and Political Liberalization: Some Theoretical Considerations.” In Markets &
Democracy in Latin America, ed. Philip Oxhorn and Pamela K. Starr. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Pereira, Anthony W. Pereira. 1993. “Economic Underdevelopment, Democracy and Civil
Society: The North-East Brazilian Case.” Third World Quarterly. 14 (2): 365-380.
Putnam, Robert. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’sDeclining Scoail Capital.” Journal of
Democracy. 6(1): 65-78
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theory and Facts.” World
Politics 49(2), 155-183.
Rosenberg, S.W. 1998. “The Structure of Political Thinking. American Journal of Political
Science. 32, 539-566.
Samuels, David. “Progressive Ambition, Federalism, and Pork-Barreling in Brazil.” In
Legislative Politics in Latin America, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Samuels, David. 2000. "Ambition and Competition: Explaining Legislative Turnover in Brazil."
Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (3): 481-97
Samuels, David, and Richard Snyder. 2001. "The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in
Comparative Perspective." British Journal of Political Science 31 (4): 651-71

109

Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1966. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.
Chicago: Rand McNally
Selcher, Wayne. 1998. “The Politics of Decentralized Federalism, National Diversification, and
Regionalism in Brazil.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World affairs. 40 (4), 2550.
Snyder, Richard, and David Samuels. 2004. "Strong Legislative Malapportionment in Latin
America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives." In Federalism and Democracy in
Latin America, ed. Edward Gibson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Sondrol, Paul C. 1997. “Paraguay and Uruguay: Modernity, Tradition and Transition.” Third
World Quarterly. 18 (1.), 109-125.
Spektorowski, Alberto. 2000. “Nationalism and democratic construction: the origins of
Argentina and Uruguay's political cultures in comparative perspective.” Bulletin of Latin
American Research, 19 (1), 81–99
Spiller, Pablo T., and Mariano Tommasi. 2006. "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy."
In Argentine Democracy, ed. Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo. University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Stallings, Barbara. 1002. “International Influence on Economic Policy. In the Politics of
Economic Adjustment, eds. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Stepan, Alfred. 2004. " Electorally Generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems." In
Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Edward Gibson. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Taagepera, Rein and Matthew S. Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and
Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Teichman, Judith A. 2001. The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America. Chapel Hill, NC:
The University of North Carolina Press.
U.N. Development Programme. 1992. “Human Development Report 1992.”
U.N. Development Programme. 1991. “Report on Human Development in Argentina.
U.N. Development Programme. 1991. “Report on Human Development in Brazil.
U.N. Development Programme and U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean. 2001. “Desarollo humano en Uruguay.”
Vacs, Aldo. 1994. Convergence and Dissension. In Latin American Political Economy in the
Age of Neoliberal Reform, eds. William Smith, Carlos Acuña, and Eduardo Gamarra.
New Brunswick: Transaction Press.
110

Weyland, Kurt. 2002. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Williamson, John. 1990. “What Washington Means by Policy Reform.” In Latin American
Adjustment: How Much Has Happened, ed. John Williamson. Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics.
Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs,
November/December

111

